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Article 
Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus 
Incitement 
Alexander Tsesis†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
First Amendment jurisprudence has produced a tense in-
terplay between libertarian and public safety concerns.1 While 
the Supreme Court has typically found content restrictions on 
speech to infringe the individual right to self-expression,2 it has 
also determined that the regulation of intentional intimidation, 
group defamation, and advice to terrorists are constitutional.3
Most recently, the Court ruled in favor of belligerent fu-
neral protestors’ expressive interests over a mourner’s claim 
that he suffered severe emotional distress from their bellicosi-
ty.
 
These contrasting emphases on liberty and safety have been ev-
ident from the differing treatments of outrageous and threaten-
ing speech. 
4
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
I am grateful for the advice of Ian Bartrum, John Bronsteen, Laura Cisneros, 
Danielle Citron, Jessie Hill, Roberta Kwall, Marcia McCormick, Helen Norton, 
Karen Petroski, and Ofer Raban. Copyright © 2013 by Alexander Tsesis. 
 On a separate matter, the Court found that there is no 
 1. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2010) (discussing the political liberty and political 
equality approaches to the First Amendment); Alexander Tsesis, Self-
Government and the Declaration of Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 
739–51 (2012) [hereinafter Tsesis, Self-Government] (explaining how princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence impact First Amendment standards 
related to freedom and participation). 
 2. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First 
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 
(2010) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the know-
ing supply of material support to foreign terrorist organizations); Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (upholding state cross burning statute because 
of the symbol’s link to the Ku Klux Klan). 
 4. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011). 
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compelling state reason to label violent video games in order to 
prevent their distribution to minors.5 In both cases, the Court 
found that the Constitution protects provocative and insensi-
tive speech, even when it causes others grief and anger.6 These 
holdings were in keeping with the Court’s traditional doctrine 
that speech cannot be criminalized solely because of its offen-
sive content.7
The nearly categorical proscription against interfering with 
expressions that elicit negative emotional responses stands in 
sharp contrast to the deference the Court has shown to states’ 
policies prohibiting organizations or individuals from spreading 
messages meant to incite others to commit harmful actions. 
Contrary to accepted lore in much academic literature, the Su-
preme Court has on several occasions recognized that some 
public safety concerns warrant state regulations on threatening 
expressions, even when they pose no imminent threat of harm.
 
8 
The modern judicial trend is to defer to public policies that curb 
incitement, group defamation, and material support to organi-
zations whose stated purposes are violent.9
This bifurcation between offensive and threatening speech 
more accurately explains the Court’s contextual approach than 
the accepted belief among many prominent First Amendment 
scholars, such as Professors Steven Gey and Daniel Farber, 
that absent a showing of immediate harm courts must find con-
tent regulations against incitement to be facially unconstitu-
tional.
 
10
 
 5. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 Judicially recognized limits on cross burning and the 
funding of terrorist organizations also run counter to Dean 
Robert Post’s assertion that the First Amendment bars the en-
 6. Id. at 2733; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215. 
 7. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
 8. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2731; Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
 9. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2731; Black, 538 
U.S. at 363. 
 10. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting 
Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 925 (2009) (“[I]t can 
hardly be viewed as a surprise that the government is entitled to prevent indi-
viduals from threatening an individual or the public with immediate vio-
lence.”); Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, 
and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2005) [hereinafter Gey, 
Questions About Cross Burning] (“The . . . First Amendment issue involves the 
bedrock principle that political advocacy is protected from government regula-
tion unless the advocacy takes the form of incitement, the advocacy occurs in a 
context where an immediate concrete harm follows from the speech in ques-
tion, and the speaker intends his or her speech to instigate the immediate 
harm.”). 
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actment of statutes that differentiate between “harmful” and 
“beneficial ideas.”11 To the contrary, states can prohibit speech 
that threatens public peace precisely because of its content.12 
First Amendment jurisprudence contains a clear demarcation 
between restraints on statements tending to offend and those 
intrinsically dangerous to public safety.13 Without first examin-
ing evidence about what the speaker meant to convey, a court 
cannot make that distinction. In upholding restrictions on in-
timidating speech, the Supreme Court resorts to neither the 
imminent threat of harm nor the strict scrutiny tests. Instead, 
its constitutional assessment is more comprehensive, delving 
into whether the stated reasons for regulations implicate sub-
stantial interests in public security and safety.14
Some journalists disapproved of regulations on speech that 
posed no imminent threat of harm. Several popular media out-
lets expressed visceral opposition to Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project (HLP), which upheld a federal ban against giving 
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
 
15 
An anonymous editorial in the Washington Post asserted that 
the holding would give the federal government sweeping power 
to criminalize the contacting of terrorist organizations even if 
the aim of the communication were to help negotiate a cessa-
tion of violence.16
 
 11. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 477, 484 (2011) (asserting that the political presumption of equal, indi-
vidual autonomy “underwrites the First Amendment doctrine’s refusal to dis-
tinguish between good and bad ideas, true or false ideas, or harmful or benefi-
cial ideas”). 
 A Los Angeles Times editorial took a decidedly 
textualist approach to the First Amendment, asserting that the 
majority in HLP had “[d]isregard[ed] the dictionary as well as 
 12. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“[J]ust as a State may regulate only that 
obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a 
State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely 
to inspire fear of bodily harm.”). 
 13. Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“Such speech 
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”), with 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (holding that the statute does 
not violate the First Amendment “[g]iven the sensitive interests in national 
security and foreign affairs at stake”). 
 14. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (asserting that 
the “evaluation of the facts by the Executive . . . is entitled to deference [be-
cause t]his litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national se-
curity and foreign affairs”). 
 15. See id. at 2731. 
 16. Editorial, Material Error: The Court Goes Too Far in the Name of 
Fighting Terrorism, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A18. 
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the Constitution.”17 On the constitutional side, these editorials 
did not distinguish between protected speech that some listen-
ers find to be outrageous and unprotected speech that facili-
tates the commission of violent crimes; a distinction on which 
this Article focuses. On the political side, these editorials ig-
nored an organization’s ability to be taken off the designated 
list by desisting from terror.18 On the material side, the criti-
cisms discounted the fungibility of funds contributed for non-
violent activities, freeing up a terrorist group’s ability to exploit 
other resources to commit acts of violence.19
This is the first article to clearly describe the constitutional 
distinctions between the Supreme Court’s divergent approach 
to affective and intimidating communications. Although the 
liberty interest of non-violent groups is protected by the First 
Amendment even when it crosses into indecency, state and fed-
eral governments can regulate speech that threatens the safety 
of others. Hurt feelings are not legally cognizable harms. On 
the other hand, speech that poses a threat is beyond the ambit 
of free speech protections. 
 
Part I of the Article surveys the Supreme Court’s recent 
guidance on the constitutional value of offensive, emotionally 
charged speech. In this area, the Court has opted to protect 
speakers’ expressive interests. Part II distinguishes offensive 
expressions from those that threaten others’ well-being, digni-
ty, or security. After describing the evolution of jurisprudence 
dealing with the regulation of inflammatory speech, I take up 
the special case of digital communications, which are dissemi-
nated in a realm where the imminent threat of harm and 
fighting words tests have little relevance. When reviewing reg-
ulations against purposeful threats, the Court has recognized 
several categories of content regulations that have historically 
withstood judicial scrutiny.20
 
 17. Editorial, Terror and Free Speech, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A12. 
 Part III argues against the view of 
those First Amendment scholars who believe restrictions on 
 18. Federal statute requires the State Department to periodically review 
whether a group should continue to be designated a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 19. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (“The State De-
partment informs us that ‘[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. govern-
ment agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]’ Con-
gress’s finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further 
their terrorism.”). 
 20. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
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group defamation, hate symbols, and material support of ter-
rorists violate the First Amendment.21
I.  EMOTIVE AND OFFENSIVE EXPRESSIONS   
 
A. OFFENSIVE SPEECH 
The judiciary has played a central role in safeguarding the 
rights of speakers to make statements even when the content 
offends audiences.22 This doctrinal tradition is not derived from 
the literal wording of the First Amendment, which explicitly 
only prohibits Congress from abridging free speech.23
Snyder v. Phelps, the first of three recent cases on constitu-
tionally protected offensive speech, arose from a funeral protest 
by the pastor and parishioners of the Westboro Baptist 
Church.
 The Court 
regards obnoxious and degrading speech to be presumptively 
protected from content-based restrictions that can infringe 
First Amendment rights. 
24
 
 21. In a recent article Professor Jeremy Waldron explained how and why 
group defamation statutes further the legitimate public interest in maintain-
ing a “well-ordered society.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The 
Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1626–30 (2010) (“[W]hen people call 
for the sort of assurance to which hate speech laws might make a contribution, 
it is not on the controversial details of justice. Instead, it is on some of the 
most elementary fundamentals—that all are equally human and have the dig-
nity of humanity, that all have an elementary entitlement to justice, and that 
all deserve protection from the most egregious forms of violence, exclusion, 
and subordination.”). The Canadian Supreme Court has made a similar point 
in an opinion upholding a restriction on hate propaganda: 
 Participants displayed signs with messages, such as 
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11” and “God Hates 
Fags,” in protest of the United States’ tolerance of homosexu-
[Hate propaganda] undermines the dignity and self-worth of target 
group members and, more generally, contributes to disharmonious re-
lations among various racial, cultural and religious groups, as a re-
sult eroding the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish in 
a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equality. 
Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Comm’n, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 894 (Can.). 
 22. In the landmark Hustler Magazine v. Falwell decision, the Court 
unanimously held that proof of malice was needed to prove a tort of intention-
al infliction of severe emotional distress about a matter of public concern. 485 
U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 23. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”). The Court signaled in 1938 that free speech 
would be one of the categories it would give “more exacting judicial scrutiny” 
against state abuse. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938). 
 24. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213–14 (2011). 
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als.25 After Westboro picketed a deceased soldier’s funeral, his 
father, Albert Snyder, filed a lawsuit in which he claimed their 
antics caused him to suffer “severe and lasting emotional inju-
ry.”26 The protesters confined themselves to public land, in 
keeping with police orders for staging the demonstration.27 Pro-
testors did not enter the cemetery, used no violence, and did 
not yell or use any profanity.28
The district court, nevertheless, found them liable for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion into seclu-
sion, and civil conspiracy.
 
29 The court of appeals reversed on 
First Amendment grounds.30 The Supreme Court, then, upheld 
the appellate court’s decision, finding that the distress occa-
sioned by the picketing “turned on the content and viewpoint of 
the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the 
funeral itself.”31
The Court made clear that the liberty to express a political 
viewpoint was not actionable solely “because it is upsetting or 
arouses contempt.”
 
32 The First Amendment shields speech even 
when it is made under circumstances that some people might 
find to be hurtful or misguided.33 The decision was in keeping 
with the established distinction between narrowly tailored reg-
ulations that further compelling government purposes, like de-
terring violence, and overbroad prohibitions that are meant to 
safeguard emotional sensitivities by restraining speakers from 
uttering unpleasant or even uncivil statements. Government is 
prohibited from showing favoritism to the viewpoint of one in-
dividual over another, even when the expressed message has 
an unpleasant impact on the audience.34
Had the plaintiff in Snyder been a captive audience to the 
protest, unable to avoid it, some government regulation would 
 
 
 25. Id. at 1213. 
 26. Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1214. 
 30. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 31. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . . is to shield 
just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even 
hurtful.”). 
 34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (stating 
that government cannot restrict speech in order to raise the profile of more 
favored points of view). 
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have been warranted.35 But at the time of the funeral the 
Westboro protesters were 1000 feet away, and the plaintiff 
could not read their signs nor make out what they were say-
ing.36 He only later found out details through a news report 
about the event.37
The physical distance between them was only one im-
portant contextual fact. The protesters meant to shock the con-
science but not to intimidate Snyder’s entourage.
 
38 Without any 
contemporaneous awareness of the message, Snyder was una-
ble to prove the picketers were intentionally threatening him.39 
Whether the Court’s decision is regarded from Dean Robert 
Post’s democratic value of free speech40 or Professor Edwin 
Baker’s autonomy perspective,41
There is nothing novel about the conclusion that outra-
geous, non-menacing speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment. The Snyder majority’s dismissiveness that statements 
made at a distance can be threatening is, however, suspect. The 
key question, as I will show in Part III, is whether the speaker 
means to intimidate, defame, or advance criminal conduct. 
 the Westboro community’s 
right to publically present their views on a controversial subject 
was intrinsic to the speech values of the First Amendment. The 
protestors did not threaten the democratic order; to the contra-
ry, they were exercising their rights to political speech and self-
expression. 
 
 35. The court sparingly applies the captive audience doctrine. Snyder, 131 
S. Ct. at 1220; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (describing 
circumstances in which the government can selectively censor offensive ex-
pression because “the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwill-
ing viewer or auditor to avoid exposure”). 
 36. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213–14. 
 37. Id. 
 38. One indicator that church members did not intimidate mourners was 
that Westboro notified the authorities of their intent to picket and then fol-
lowed police orders throughout the demonstration. Id. at 1213. Bringing police 
into event planning reduced the risk of physical altercation. 
 39. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate 
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1435, 1463 (2011) (describing a context-specific analysis for evaluating wheth-
er outrageous, humiliating, and intrusive speech can be said to result in the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 40. See Post, supra note 11, at 482–83 (explaining why free speech protec-
tions are best understood to be democracy enhancing rather than autonomy 
oriented). 
 41. C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Prin-
ciple?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515, 522, 526 (2011) (asserting that the key feature of 
free speech is autonomy, within the context of political speech and outside of 
it). 
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Those offenses may be committed even where speaker and tar-
get are not in close proximity. For instance, when threats are 
posted on the Internet, a billboard, or school blackboard, the ob-
ject of the message might come across the message later, or not 
at all, but the forewarning of harm may be no less real. In 
Snyder, no such threat was involved, but where the intent is to 
intimidate another, even at some future time, the potential for 
harm is elevated. Professor Kenneth L. Karst has pointed out 
that even when death threats are made from afar they can re-
sult in long-term anxieties and traumas.42 If members of the 
Westboro Church had gone beyond obnoxious and callous 
statements to intentional threats against the funeral proces-
sion, they might have been held criminally liable.43
B. DEPICTIONS OF CRUELTY 
 The prece-
dential value of Snyder, then, should be limited to circumstanc-
es when picketers do not mean to threaten a public audience. 
Snyder falls into a line of precedents that protect “disa-
greeable”44 or “scurrilous”45 speech, even when such communi-
cation “stirs people to anger.”46
In a 2010 case, United States v. Stevens, the Court struck 
down a federal statute prohibiting the creation, sale, and pos-
session of videos depicting animal cruelty, finding that the law 
was impermissibly overbroad.
 Neither a community’s sense of 
morality nor individual sensibilities can gainsay the liberty in-
terest of an individual to make a statement, even one that 
many would deem to be inappropriate and disgusting. A closely 
related category protects repulsive audio-visual depictions. 
47
 
 42. See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern 
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (2006). 
 In its brief, the United States 
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 74–76. 
 44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock prin-
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable.”). 
 45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (explaining a First 
Amendment challenge to a state law against “offensive conduct” in public dis-
course). 
 46. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (overturning a conviction 
under a disorderly conduct law). 
 47. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584, 1592 (2010). The majority found the statute to 
be overbroad and did not decide whether a similar statute limited to depictions 
of animal cruelty would be permissible. Id. The dissent, on the other hand, 
thought the Court mischaracterized the case as dealing with speech rather 
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asserted that “[l]ike obscenity, the depictions [of human cruelty 
to animals] are of patently offensive conduct that appeals only 
to the basest instincts.”48 Similarly, the Humane Society’s ami-
cus brief compared crush videos to obscenity, asserting that 
“[l]ike depraved sexual materials banned by obscenity laws, 
crush and dogfighting videos are ‘patently offensive,’ lack seri-
ous social value, and appeal to base human instincts rather 
than conveying any ideas or information.”49
The majority in Stevens, however, rejected the govern-
ment’s comparison of offensive speech to sexually prurient ma-
terial.
 
50 The Court’s differentiation between depictions of ani-
mal violence and obscenity was predicated on judicial 
exclusivity in the interpretation of the Constitution51: under its 
doctrinal framework, only the judiciary can identify which ex-
pressions do or do not qualify as speech for First Amendment 
purposes. Congress, on the other hand, is prohibited from using 
cost-benefit analysis or moralism for regulating speech.52 The 
Court in Stevens also distinguished the depiction of cruelty to 
animals from the narrow class of communications that go be-
yond the aegis of the First Amendment, including the incite-
ment to imminent lawlessness,53 group defamation,54 child por-
nography,55 and solicitation to commit a crime.56 Unlike 
criminal laws prohibiting actual cruelty to animals, the federal 
law that the Court struck down in Stevens targeted only the 
distribution of its depiction.57
 
than cruel acts committed to animals. Id. at 1592 (Alito, J., dissenting). For 
the dissent, the case was about conduct, not speech. 
 
 48. Brief for the United States at 9, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08-769). 
 49. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in 
Support of Petitioner at 21, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08-769). 
 50. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584–86. 
 51. See Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: The American Creed 
and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 731 (2009) (arguing that 
judicial intrusion into legislative enforcement authority violates the framing 
principle of self-government). 
 52. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (noting that categories of free speech 
falling outside of First Amendment protection are not upheld on cost-benefit 
grounds). 
 53. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 54. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
 55. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754–63 (1982). 
 56. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008). 
 57. The federal statute the Court found to be unconstitutional in Stevens 
grew out of a nationwide concern. The law prohibited the creation, sale, and 
possession of “a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that 
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain.” 18 U.S.C. 
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While Stevens like Snyder dealt with offensive speech, 
there was a key, overlooked difference between the two. In Ste-
vens the depiction of animal cruelty required the previous 
commission of a violent act that is illegal in all United States 
jurisdictions,58 while Snyder was a pure speech case. Despite 
this clear distinction, which might have led to different re-
sults,59
Self-expression with no intent to instigate criminal con-
duct, which was at play in Stevens and Snyder, was also central 
in a 2010 Supreme Court term decision. In Brown v. Enter-
tainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court rejected Califor-
nia’s attempt to prohibit the electronic distribution of violent 
content to children.
 the unifying premise in both decisions is that offensive 
and outrageous speech is protected where it is made without 
any intent to intimidate or solicit criminal conduct. The majori-
ty’s error in Stevens was to discount past criminality in the test 
for communicative legitimacy. 
60 The Court invalidated a state regulation 
against renting and selling violent video games to minors that 
are “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the communi-
ty.”61 Like videos depicting cruelty to animals, the Court did not 
regard violent electronic games to be analogous to obscenity be-
cause no violent intent was involved in the games.62
 
§ 48(a) (2000) (reenacted as Pub. L. 111-294 § 3(c), 124 Stat. 3179 (2010)). The 
District of Columbia and all fifty states have statutes prohibiting the cruel 
treatment of animals. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 
2008). Stevens was convicted in Pennsylvania but lived in Virginia. In Penn-
sylvania, cruelty to animals includes “wantonly or cruelly” abusing or neglect-
ing an animal over “which he has a duty of care.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(c) 
(2007). Likewise, the abandonment of an animal or deprivation of “sustenance, 
drink, shelter or veterinary care, or access to clean and sanitary shelter which 
will protect the animal against inclement weather and preserve the animal’s 
body heat and keep it dry” are also criminally actionable. Id. 
 Like 
Snyder, the expressive conduct of renting and selling violent 
video games was not interwoven with criminality, as it was in 
Stevens, but the Court did not revisit the latter decision. The 
 58. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes against cru-
elty to animals. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 223 n.4 (listing citations to state and 
District of Columbia animal cruelty statutes). 
 59. Justice Alito regarded the case to be about conduct rather than 
speech. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (“The Court strikes down in its entirety a valuable statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 48, that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific acts of 
animal cruelty—in particular, the creation and commercial exploitation of 
‘crush videos,’ a form of depraved entertainment that has no social value.”). 
 60. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011). 
 61. Id. at 2732, 2742. 
 62. Id. at 2734. 
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Court in Entertainment Merchants found that California lacked 
a compelling reason to enact a value laden content regulation, 
even when the law was based on its parens patriae power over 
children’s welfare.63
The holdings in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants are 
closely linked to the Snyder decision barring regulation of dis-
turbing and outrageous expression. All three rulings were 
based on the principle that offensive, detestable, and even re-
volting speech is protected where there is no intent to instigate 
violence or intimidate the public.
 
64
II.  INFLAMMATORY SPEECH   
 While Stevens misapplied 
the principle to expression arising from actual rather than fic-
tional criminal conduct, the ruling accurately reflects the facial 
First Amendment doctrine. This fairly well settled area of law 
is in sharp contrast to the often heated disputes about the legit-
imacy of regulations that target belligerent, instigative, and 
hate speech. As we will see in Part II, the Court has been more 
deferential of content regulations on self-expression that are 
fashioned to maintain public safety and to protect private repu-
tation. 
In Snyder, Stevens, and Entertainment Merchants, the 
Court relied on the well-established premise that speech is a 
fundamental interest, protected even when it is offensive. The 
constitutional right to unencumbered private speech outweighs 
hurt feelings and moralistic concerns. The Court distinguishes 
this form of communication from intentionally intimidating 
statements; with regulations of the latter, it is the civic interest 
in safety that outweighs expressive liberty. Even then, the 
prosecution bears a heavy burden of proof because a risk exists 
of government intrusion. While criminal regulation of incite-
ment requires proof of intent, the Court recognizes the social 
interest in protecting civil order against public disturbances 
likely to instigate fist fights.65
 
 63. Id. at 2735–36. 
 The extent to which states can 
 64. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 952, 999 (2d ed. 2002). The Court has found the same protection for 
violent depictions of cruelty to animals and gory video games as it had earlier 
for displaying the emotive words “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse, Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), and the burning a flag at a rally, Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 65. The Court has explicitly rejected  
the view that freedom of speech and association . . . as protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes,’ not only in the 
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restrict individuals from displaying hate symbols, uttering rac-
ist epithets, and advising terrorists has caused a great deal of 
academic and judicial controversy.  
A. HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 
From its earliest developments following the First World 
War, First Amendment jurisprudence addressed the question of 
whether states can prohibit incitement. Three cases that arose 
from prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 191766—Schenck 
v. United States,67 Frohwerk v. United States,68 and Debs v. 
United States69
Charles T. Schenck was criminally convicted under a fed-
eral statute that prohibited interference with the U.S. effort to 
recruit soldiers during the First World War.
—established the groundwork for contemporary 
doctrine. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. drafted all three 
majority opinions. Schenck remains the most influential of this 
trilogy. 
70 Evidence at trial 
showed that Schenck had intentionally mailed pamphlets, urg-
ing young men to resist military conscription.71 The Court up-
held his conviction and, more importantly for posterity, devel-
oped the “clear and present danger” test for reviewing cases of 
incitement.72
 
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it 
must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection 
must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amend-
ment. 
 It allowed for limitations on speech when there 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); see also Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the 
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
Of all the Supreme Court Justices only Hugo Black held an absolutist view on 
free speech. See Hugo L. Black & Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First 
Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553 (1962) 
(“The beginning of the First Amendment is that ‘Congress shall make no law.’ 
I understand that it is rather old-fashioned and shows a slight naïveté to say 
that ‘no law’ means no law. It is one of the most amazing things about the in-
geniousness of the times that strong arguments are made, which almost con-
vince me, that it is very foolish of me to think ‘no law’ means no law.”). 
 66. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 
217, 219 (amended 1997) (punishing the expression of sentiments that under-
mine war efforts). 
 67. 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919). 
 68. 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919). 
 69. 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919). 
 70. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. 
 71. Id. at 49–50. 
 72. Id. at 52 (“The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
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was a high probability it would cause grave harm.73
Just a week after deciding Schenck, the Court clarified that 
a criminal conviction for speech could not be based solely on the 
content of the message, but instead required the government to 
prove up the intent of the speaker and the context of the utter-
ance.
 Judges 
were thereby empowered to balance concerns for self-
expression against those of public safety, leaving some room for 
subjective adjudication. Ambiguity of what constituted a clearly 
present danger required additional doctrinal development. 
74 The trial court in Frohwerk issued arrest warrants for 
printing and circulating articles opposing military service.75 
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not 
“give immunity for every possible use of language”; for in-
stance, criminalizing incitement to murder is not unconstitu-
tional.76 Jacob Frohwerk’s intent to obstruct recruitment was 
evident from his working jointly with others, even though he 
lacked the means to carry out the scheme.77 The Court did not, 
however, connect intent with the temporal proximity of likely 
harm.78
Frohwerk’s principle that restrictions on speech must be 
judged on a case-by-case basis is consistent with civil procedure 
rules of standing and ripeness,
 
79 but today a court would cer-
tainly find that the First Amendment protects the expression of 
antiwar sentiments.80
 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent.”). 
 None of the extant history suggests that 
 73. Hand’s model of the clear and present danger test requires courts to 
“ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” See, e.g., 
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 74. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (explaining that a 
statement’s potential “to kindle a flame” should be partly judged by the com-
munity where it is circulated); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“If the act, (speaking 
or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are 
the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants mak-
ing the act a crime.”). 
 75. Two Missouri Editors Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1918, at 7. 
 76. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206. 
 77. Id. at 209. 
 78. Id. 
 79. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doc-
trines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s 
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than standing does.”); Nat’l Park Hos-
pitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (describing how the 
doctrine of ripeness is aimed at avoiding premature judicial adjudication for 
the court to avoid entangling itself in abstract disagreements). 
 80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 
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Frohwerk was seeking to instigate a clear and present public 
danger.81 He seemed instead to have been voicing his opinion 
against the war. His resistance efforts were just as outrageous 
to many Americans living during the Wilson administration as 
the statement of funeral protestors in Snyder v. Phelps may 
sound to modern sensibilities. Offensive speech, as we saw in 
Part I, is constitutionally protected. For the present Article, the 
questionable application of the Espionage Act of 191782
Frohwerk and Schenck determined that there are catego-
ries of anti-social communications that involve more than the 
private interest to self-expression. In both of those cases, the 
Court was convinced that the speakers’ intent to instigate re-
sistance to conscription posed a clear danger. The flaw of these 
judgments was in upholding the suppression and punishment 
 is of 
lesser moment than the lasting impact the clear and present 
danger test has had on First Amendment doctrine. 
 
(1969) (holding that the First Amendment barred the suspension of students 
who wore antiwar armbands to express their opposition to the Vietnam War 
without causing any “substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities”); see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applica-
ble Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the 
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005) (“[U]nder modern 
First Amendment law, courts would overturn convictions for antiwar leaflet-
ing or speeches, and would treat the law as content-based.”); James Weinstein, 
Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Re-
ply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 666 (2011) (“[A]n antiwar protest in a public forum, is 
afforded a much stronger presumption of protection than most other forms of 
expression.”). 
 81. For contemporary accounts of Frohwerk’s journalism for the Missouri 
Staats Zeitung and Kansas Staats Zeitung that led to his conviction, see Ger-
man Americans Sought to Stop Allies’ Munitions, EVENING INDEP. (Massillon, 
Ohio), Mar. 5, 1918, at 14; Threaten Boycott Against Ellinwood Democratic Ed-
itor Because He’s for Hughes but He Stands Firm and Scorns Democratic 
Leaders Who Make Threats Against Him, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Hutchinson, 
Kan.), Oct. 28, 1916, at 16. 
 82. In another case arising from criticism of the Wilson administration’s 
handling of World War I, the Court upheld the conviction of the socialist lead-
er Eugene Debs. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Eugene Debs 
Must Serve Prison Term, OGDEN EXAMINER (Ogden, Utah), Mar. 11, 1919, at 
1; To Begin Sentence, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Hutchinson, Kan.), May 31, 1919, 
at 1. The conviction was so questionable that after taking office, President 
Warren Harding pardoned Debs. JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 128 
(2004) (discussing President Harding’s commutation of Debs’s sentence and 
their meeting at the White House); Dan M. Kahan, Cognitively Illiberal State, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 131 n.62 (2007) (comparing Debs conviction to the 
Court’s infamous holding on discrimination against homosexuals); Ken 
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor 
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1715 n.63 (2004) (stating that Debs did nothing 
that would currently constitute espionage). 
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of political statements that were not menacing, violent, or dan-
gerous. It would take years for the Court to provide guidance 
that would prevent government from interfering with antiwar 
sentiments while recognizing the public need to protect civic 
tranquility against intentional threats. 
B. THE MODERN TEST 
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court rejected the claim that 
hateful statements made without the intent to intimidate the 
public can be actionable.83 The per curiam opinion extended the 
right of free expression to abstract statements voiced only in 
the presence of like-minded individuals and invited guests.84 
The case arose from a rally to which only Klan members and 
two guests were invited.85 The Court found the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism Act86 to be unconstitutional because it punished 
mere advocacy of unlawful actions, even in a circumstance 
when a speaker did not threaten or incite others to commit 
imminent criminality.87
The key events in Brandenburg occurred at a Ku Klux 
Klan rally to which Klansmen had invited a journalist and 
cameraman.
 
88 The closed nature of the event rendered it impos-
sible for speakers to scare or intimidate the public at large.89 As 
a guest, the television crew was not intimidated by the proceed-
ings because its presence was desired by the organizers; there-
fore, there was no true threat to anyone at the rally.90
 
 83. 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
 The ap-
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 445–46 (“The record shows that a man, identified at trial as 
the appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati 
television station and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan ‘rally’ to be held 
at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation of the organizers, the re-
porter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events. Portions 
of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a national net-
work. . . . No one was present other than the participants and the newsmen 
who made the film.”). 
 86. The statute criminalized “‘advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or pro-
priety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a 
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily 
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach 
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’” Id. at 444–45 (quoting 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13). 
 87. See id. at 449. 
 88. See supra note 85. 
 89. Other than Klansmen, only an invited reporter and cameraman at-
tended. Brandenburg, U.S. 395 at 445. 
 90. A Klansman made a speech couched in hypothetical terms rather than 
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pellate record provided no examples of direct threats being 
made, only outrageously prejudicial statements about Jews and 
blacks.91
The Supreme Court, therefore, overturned Brandenburg’s 
conviction because the prosecution did not prove his speech was 
likely to cause an imminent public disturbance.
 While the facts of this case were quite different from 
Snyder, the Court’s decision to protect speech in both was 
based on the same principle: the First Amendment generally 
protects statements not meant to place others in fear of their 
safety. 
92 Nor was there 
any proof that the Klansmen were conspiring to commit a 
crime. Statements made at the rally were offensive but used 
generalities rather than specific threats.93 The private context 
in which the offensive statements were made indicated to the 
Court that the speaker had not attempted to instigate immedi-
ate violence.94
States and the federal government, on the other hand, 
have an interest in criminalizing true threats that, unlike the 
 
 
orders to immediate action: “The Klan . . . . [is] not a revengent [sic] organiza-
tion, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to sup-
press the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance [sic] taken.” Id. at 446. These derogatory statements, the Court 
found, did not incite those who were present to commit imminently violent 
acts. See id. at 448–49. 
 91. The tape of the event was electronically distorted and little could be 
understood from it. The Court found that:  
The significant portions that could be understood were: “How far is 
the nigger going to-yeah.” “This is what we are going to do to the nig-
gers.” “A dirty nigger.” “Send the Jews back to Israel.” “Let's give 
them back to the dark garden.” “Save America.” “Let's go back to con-
stitutional betterment.” “Bury the niggers.” “We intend to do our 
part.” “Give us our state rights.” “Freedom for the whites.” “Nigger 
will have to fight for every inch he gets from now on.” 
Id. at 446 n.1. In another film of the rally someone asserted, “Personally, I be-
lieve the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Id. 
at 447. 
 92. See id. at 447–49. 
 93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The “true threat” standard, 
which I discuss at the text accompanying footnotes 104–109, is laid out in Vir-
ginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 94. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49. The “imminent threat of harm” 
test, like its “clear and present danger” forerunner, was derived from John 
Stuart Mill’s context-based example of criticism against corn dealers safely 
delivered through the press, as opposed to a speech to a starving mob gathered 
in front of the corn merchant’s house. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
100–01 (London, John W. Parker and Son 2d ed. 1859). Ultimately, Mill was 
more circumspect about legitimate speech than American legal standards. He 
thought that the liberty of speech extended only so far as the speaker did “not 
make himself a nuisance to other people.” Id. at 101. 
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breast-beating statements at the Brandenburg rally, are meant 
to intimidate the public rather than simply invigorate fanatics 
or outrage opponents.95
The seminal case on true threats, Watts v. United States, 
involved the conviction of a defendant who told a crowd gath-
ered to protest the Vietnam War draft at the Washington Mon-
ument, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 
to get in my sights is L.B.J.”
 The Supreme Court has expressly dif-
ferentiated the true threat standard from the Brandenburg 
imminent threat of harm test. 
96 The speaker was charged under 
a federal statute, providing criminal penalties for willfully and 
knowingly threatening the president.97 This was said at a far 
more public forum than the private gathering in Brandenburg. 
While a jury in Watts found the speaker had willfully threat-
ened the president, there was no indication that he meant to 
injure him.98 The Supreme Court found in favor of the speaker, 
holding that he exhibited no actual intent to commit the 
threatened harm but nevertheless upheld the statute on its 
face.99
Given that Watts overturned the conviction for threatening 
the president but confirmed the constitutionality of a statute 
that criminalized intentional intimidation, the Court spawned 
obscurity about what constituted a true threat. The Second Cir-
cuit interpreted Watts to recognize only the constitutionality of 
true threats statutes that punished instances of “unequivocal, 
unconditional, immediate and specific” personal threats.
 
100
 
 95. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam) 
(deciding that a willful threat against the President of the United States is an 
unprotected form of expression); In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding that “malicious cross burning” on the private property of 
another was a “true threat”). 
 The 
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did not include the Branden-
burg immediacy in its definition. A true threat according to the 
 96. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
 97. In relevant part, the statute created a criminal cause of action against 
anyone who “knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against 
the President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order 
of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 871(a) (2006) (matching the language the Court quoted in Watts, 394 U.S. at 
705). 
 98. Watts moved the court to acquit him because his statement was made 
conditionally, in the event that he were to be drafted, during the course of po-
litical debate, and as a joke at which the crowd laughed. Watts, 394 U.S. at 
706–07. 
 99. See id. at 708. 
 100. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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latter circuit was decided by an “objective” test of “whether a 
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or as-
sault.”101 The two circuits diverged in their points of reference 
concerning the relevant standard, specifically about if a court 
should focus on whether the speaker reasonably foresaw that 
his words would affect the recipient of the statement or on 
whether the recipient would reasonably sense a threat.102 From 
both perspectives, assessment of the context of the statement, 
the speaker’s intent, and whether the type of audience present 
has a history of violence under similar circumstances are perti-
nent.103
The Court resolved the circuit split when it applied the 
true threats doctrine to a state cross burning statute in Virgin-
ia v. Black.
 
104 Intent turned out to be a key component of the 
doctrine, which recognizes that the criminalization of willful in-
timidation can be used to protect public safety.105 The Court re-
jected both the Second and Ninth Circuits’ glosses, defining 
“true threats” to “encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an in-
tent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular indi-
vidual or group of individuals.”106 Nothing in that definition re-
quires any immediate risk of violence. The prosecution also 
need not prove that the speaker actually intended to carry out 
the threat.107
A trial court must evaluate whether the message contains 
words, symbols, or depictions that, under the circumstances, 
are meant to be intimidating. This requires a content rich 
 
 
 101. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 102. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 
2002) (describing the difference between the Ninth and Second Circuits’ inter-
pretations of the true threats doctrine). 
 103. Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, 
Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 539 (2005) (quoting United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d 
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 104. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 105. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342 (2008) (stating that 
civic responsibilities include the protection of health, safety, and the advance-
ment of citizens’ welfare). 
 106. Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
 107. Id. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat.”). 
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analysis.108 A majority of the justices in Black agreed with Jus-
tice O’Connor’s plurality opinion which established that inten-
tionally threatening communications, such as cross burnings 
“carried out with the intent to intimidate,” are not protected by 
the First Amendment.109 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Black, 
agreeing with the judgment that states can regulate cross 
burning,110 appeared to be a significant shift from his earlier 
conclusion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which had found con-
tent regulation of speech to be unconstitutional.111 While nei-
ther he nor the plurality in Black explicitly overturned R.A.V., 
by acknowledging that government could identify “burning a 
cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation,”112 Black 
moved away from a categorical repudiation of content-based 
regulations; a characterization that four justices who concurred 
in R.A.V. had found to be a deeply flawed analysis.113
 
 108. See id. at 360–61. 
 
 109. Id. at 363. The majority distinguished the Brandenburg and Watts 
tests, thereby establishing that they represent separate lines of First Amend-
ment precedents. See id. at 359 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.” (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per 
curiam))); id. (“And the First Amendment also permits a State to ban a ‘true 
threat.’” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per 
curiam))).  
 110. See id. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 111. 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992). In R.A.V. the Court struck down a St. 
Paul, Minnesota ordinance that prohibited the public or private display of Na-
zi swastikas or burning crosses that were known to “arouse[] anger, alarm or 
resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Id. (quoting 
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Scalia found that the ordinance was a form of content discrimination that 
violated the First Amendment. See id. at 391–96. Scalia recognized that the 
City had a compelling interest in protecting the “members of groups that have 
historically been subjected to discrimination.” Id. at 395. He nevertheless de-
cided that such a legislative intent could only be constitutionally exercised by 
a total ban on fighting words that “communicate ideas in a threatening man-
ner,” rather than only specific manifestations of certain ideas like racial or re-
ligious bigotry. Id. at 393–94. 
 112. Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“Instead of prohibiting all intimidating mes-
sages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in 
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending 
violence.”); see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colo-
rado’s Historic Embrace—and Denial—of Equal Opportunity in Higher Educa-
tion, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703, 704, 724, 781 (1999) (discussing how the Ku 
Klux Klan uses burning crosses to intimidate and organize). 
 113. Justice Byron White’s concurrence to R.A.V. drew attention to the ma-
jority’s misreading of doctrine. He found that Justice Scalia’s opinion protected 
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Justice Scalia split from the Black plurality on the mens 
rea element. Four Justices believed the prima facie element of 
the Virginia statute was unconstitutional, finding that the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s state of 
mind to meet its initial burden of production beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.114 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, believed that the 
state’s prima facie presumption of a culpable mind was consti-
tutional because the law afforded offenders the right to rebut it 
at trial.115
The plurality of the Court further found that states can 
prohibit the intimidating use of a hate symbols with a “perni-
cious history” without running afoul of the First Amendment.
 
116 
Justice Thomas, in dissent, also noted the pernicious history of 
the Klan’s use of the burning cross.117 He would have upheld 
the validity of Virginia’s cross burning statute,118 which he un-
derstood to prohibit “intimidating conduct” unprotected by the 
First Amendment.119
 
a class of communications that had been “long held to be undeserving of First 
Amendment protection.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice White believed legislators had the latitude to limit only a subset of 
fighting words constituting “the social evil of hate speech.” Id. He believed 
hate speech to be a particularly dangerous form of social evil meant to “pro-
voke violence or to inflict injury” rather than to exchange ideas. Id. 
 The plurality’s “brief history of the Ku 
Klux Klan,” Justice Thomas wrote, and his own survey of the 
organization’s past practices demonstrated that it “typically” 
used burning crosses to terrorize, intimidate, and harass “racial 
Justice Harry Blackmun added a concurrence to protest the majority’s 
categorical statements. He saw no First Amendment values “compromised by 
a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by 
burning crosses on their lawns.” Id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, 
what the majority regarded as only emotive speech, Justice Blackmun regard-
ed to be inflammatory. 
In the third concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens gave multiple exam-
ples of content regulations that the Supreme Court had earlier found to be 
constitutional. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens be-
lieved that the Court's opinion “disregard[ed] this vast body of case law” that 
had “created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech.” 
Id. at 422. 
 114. Black, 538 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion). 
 115. Id. at 369–70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. See id. at 363 (plurality opinion). 
 117. See id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s brief history 
of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces th[e] common understanding of the Klan 
as a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even elimi-
nate those it dislikes, uses the most brutal of methods.”). 
 118. See id. at 400 (“Because I would uphold the validity of this statute, I 
respectfully dissent.”). 
 119. See id. at 388. 
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minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups 
hated by the Klan.”120 Both the plurality’s and Justice Thomas’s 
arguments require content rich analyses, to determine the po-
tential cultural meanings of burning crosses. The plurality 
analogized Virginia’s ability to single out symbols with menac-
ing messages to obscenity regulations.121 Thomas similarly as-
serted that cross burning was “the paradigmatic example” of 
“profane,” unprotected speech.122 They could have also distin-
guished it from offensive or obnoxious expressions. As we saw 
earlier, the Court rejected the obscenity comparison in Enter-
tainment Merchants and Stevens,123
A more recent plurality decision, United States v. Alvarez, 
drafted by Justice Anthony Kennedy, acknowledged the exist-
ence of several “historic and traditional categories” of speech—
including defamation and true threats—that states can regu-
late without violating the First Amendment.
 thereby clearly distinguish-
ing intentionally threatening words from the expression of out-
rageous content. 
124 The plurality, 
however, rejected a balancing test to determine whether a re-
straint on speech was constitutionally permissible.125 In his 
concurrence to the case, Justice Stephen Breyer (joined by Jus-
tice Elena Kagan) explicitly refused to follow Justice Kennedy’s 
“strict categorical analysis.”126 Justice Breyer instead balanced 
the “speech-related harm” against the “nature and importance 
of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent to which 
the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether 
there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.”127
 
 120. See id. at 389. 
 Part III 
 121. See id. at 363 (plurality opinion) (“[J]ust as a State may regulate only 
that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too 
may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most 
likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”). 
 122. See id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63. 
 124. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion). 
 125. See id. (“In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free ex-
pression posed by content-based restrictions, this Court has rejected as star-
tling and dangerous a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . 
[based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” (altera-
tions in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 126. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. Although in his concurrence Justice Breyer does not explicitly de-
fine this as balancing, referring to it instead as “fit between statutory ends 
and means,” he recognizes the legitimacy of judicial analysis about whether 
the purported risk posed by the regulated speech is so great that it counter-
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demonstrates that despite the Alvarez plurality’s assertion, 
several precedents have in fact found certain categories of 
speech, like true threats, to be unprotected because of their 
harmful messages rather than their derivation from some un-
defined tradition. 
III.  PERMITTED REGULATIONS   
The true threats doctrine is one of the few exceptions to the 
content neutral requirement and imminent threat of harm 
analysis. In this Part of the Article I examine several forms of 
speech to which the Brandenburg imminence test does not and 
should not apply, despite vehement academic sentiments to the 
contrary. I begin by demonstrating the test’s insufficiency for 
regulating intimidation posted on the Internet. I then examine 
counterarguments about the constitutionality of regulations 
prohibiting threatening displays of symbols that have histori-
cally been associated with violence. Next, I analyze whether 
group defamation statutes, which First Amendment scholars 
often claim to be invalid, offer a constitutionally legitimate av-
enue of redress against reputational harms. Finally, the Article 
explains why criminalization of material support to designated 
terrorist organizations is a constitutionally justifiable means of 
preventing threats to the general welfare. In these cases, the 
public concern for safety is rightly given greater weight than 
the private interest in intimidation, defamation, and support 
for groups engaged in political violence. 
A. IMMINENT THREAT OF HARM ON THE INTERNET 
The imminent threat of harm test is too narrow in scope to 
regulate the dissemination of public threats streaming on the 
Internet. The audience of the World Wide Web is so diffuse, 
spread out throughout the world, that even intentional incite-
ment, which the Court found to be actionable in Black,128 is un-
likely to immediately instigate violence.129
 
balances “the seriousness of the speech-related harm.” Id. (emphasis added); 
see Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitution-
al Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 251–52 (2005) 
(“[B]alancing methodology [is] manifest in the Supreme Court’s familiar 
framework of tiered means-ends scrutiny, which allows many government re-
strictions on speech to survive First Amendment review.”). 
 It can, however, have 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 106–12. 
 129. For instance, United States v. Wilcox held that prosecutors did not 
meet the Brandenburg test requirements because the defendant’s racist ex-
pressions on the Internet did not advocate violence or overthrow of the gov-
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long term negative ramifications. Statements dehumanizing 
hated groups often influence the commission of discriminatory 
conduct.130 E-mail exchanges can have serious long-term conse-
quences. For example, Major Nidal Hasan engaged in an e-mail 
discussion with Imam Anwar al-Awlaki of Yemen,131 an al-
Qaeda leader who was later killed in an American drone 
strike.132 In one of his e-mails Hasan asked about the religious 
legitimacy of “fighting Jihad” to help “Muslims/Islam” and dy-
ing as a “shaheed[],” but he gave no indication that he had any 
immediate plans to carry out such an attack.133 Seeking advice 
from Awlaki, who preached elsewhere that “all Americans were 
valid targets,” was seemingly a calculated attempt to get sym-
pathetic advice;134 however, the e-mails between the two that 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations has released are not ex-
plicitly conspiratorial.135
 
ernment such that they would be unprotected “dangerous speech” under the 
particular circumstances. 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
 In another e-mail, Hasan wrote ab-
 130. ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH 
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 70–74 (2002) [hereinafter 
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES] (discussing the long-term negative conse-
quences of Internet hate speech). 
 131. “Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots”: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, & Mgmt of the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1–2 (2012) (statement of Douglas E. 
Winter, Deputy Chair, The William H. Webster Commission on the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at 
Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009), available at http://homeland.house 
.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Winter.pdf. 
 132. Zaid al-Alayaa, Yemen’s Leader Signs Agreement to Cede Power, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A10 (describing the CIA drone strike that killed al-
Awlaki, Yemen’s al-Qaeda recruiter). 
 133. See WILLIAM H. WEBSTER COMM’N ON THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE, AND THE EVENTS AT FORT HOOD, 
TEX., ON NOV. 5, 2009, FINAL REPORT 41 (2012), available at http://www.fbi 
.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster 
-commission [hereinafter FORT HOOD FBI REPORT]. 
 134. Al-Awlaki Tried to Use WMDs on Westerners, DAILY PAK BANKER 
(Pak.), Oct. 2, 2011 (asserting that al-Awlaki “claimed all Americans were val-
id targets, and directed followers to engage in armed conflict with the United 
States”). 
 135. Hasan subscribed to Al-Alwaki’s website and received generic “mass” 
e-mails from Al-Alwaki which contained religious justifications for killing. See 
FORT HOOD FBI REPORT, supra note 133, at 67–68. There were also personal 
e-mails between Hasan and Al-Alwaki. See id. at 46 (“Hasan sent six messages 
to Aulaqi . . . Aulaqi responded to Hasan twice.”). However, there was “no di-
rect connection between the personal messages and the mass-mailed ones.” Id. 
at 68. In these personal e-mails, Al-Alwaki indicated that he is unable to pre-
sent a prize for Hasan’s proposed contest seeking essays on “Why is Anwar Al 
Alwaki a great activist and leader” and thanked Hasan for his offer to help fi-
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stractly, with no stated immediate plan, that “I would assume 
that suicide bomber whose aim is to kill enemy soldiers or their 
helpers but also kill innocents in the process is acceptable.”136 
While the Brandenburg imminent threat of harm test protected 
their communications, Hasan eventually translated al-Awlaki’s 
ideology into the very action about which he had sought advice, 
carrying out a fanatically driven terrorist spree, shooting to 
death thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas.137 Awlaki later 
bragged that Hasan was his student and defended the murder 
spree as “a heroic act” and “a wonderful operation.”138
E-mails are only one form of Internet communication that 
speakers can adopt to incite violence. Web pages can stay up 
indefinitely and affect an impressionable visitor’s behavior 
shortly after the content is posted or years afterwards, a period 
far exceeding immediacy.
  
139 Recent examples of Internet in-
citements that lacked any timeframe include defense of terror-
ism;140 praise for pedophilia;141
 
nancially. See id. at 50–51. The combination of receiving personal e-mails may 
have caused Hasan to believe that the mass-emails were meant specifically for 
him. 
 and support for murdering 
 136. Id. at 58. 
 137. FORT HOOD FBI REPORT, supra note 133, at 1. 
 138. Jacob Sullum, Commentary, With Terrorists, Obama’s ‘Trust Me’ Is 
Not Enough, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at 34. In 2011, the United States 
killed Awlaki in a drone strike. ‘Workplace Violence’ Update, WKLY. STAND-
ARD, Dec. 19, 2011, at 4. 
 139. A 2002 case found that a website displaying the names and addresses 
of abortion providers with black lines through those who had been killed, in 
conjunction with “guilty” posters known to intimidate abortion physicians and 
incite violence, was a true threat not protected by the First Amendment. 
Planned Parenthood of The Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Ac-
tivists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Citron & 
Norton, supra note 39, at 1460. Along a similar line of intimidation, 
abortioncams.com is a website with images of women going into abortion clin-
ics posted to intimidate and shame patients. Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 89 n.94. 
 140. For instance, Internet messages of al-Awlaki are readily available on 
websites like YouTube, extolling the use of terror. Christopher Robbins, CIA 
Drone Strike Misses Intended Target, Kills Other Al Qaeda Members, 
GOTHAMIST (May 7, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://gothamist.com/2011/05/07/cia_ 
drone_strike_misses_intended_ta.php; see also Pippa Crerar, ‘I Don’t Feel Bit-
ter but I’m not Ready to Forgive My Knife Attacker’, EVENING STANDARD (Lon-
don), Nov. 4, 2010, available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/stephen 
-timms-i-dont-feel-bitter-but-im-not-ready-to-forgive-my-knife-attacker 
-6532423.html (discussing how a Muslim student became radicalized through 
al-Awlaki and then attempted to murder a British member of Parliament for 
his support of the Iraq War). Another example of ongoing Internet exchanges 
planning to commit terrorist acts involved Colleen LaRose, who had dubbed 
herself “Jihad Jane” on the Internet. ‘Jihad Jane’ to Testify Here in Terror 
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blacks,142 Jews,143 homosexuals,144
YouTube, an Internet source for international file sharing, 
is a platform for seven hundred al-Awlaki videos, some of them 
calling for violent jihad.
 or members of other identifi-
able groups. 
145 YouTube also hosts videos of Imam 
Abubakar Shekau, who is Imam of the Boko Haram Islamist 
group that recently took responsibility for killing 143 people in 
a terrorist attack in Kano, Nigeria.146
YouTube is an example of a platform accessible to the pub-
 Shekau’s and al-Awlaki’s 
videos typically do not call for specific or immediate violence 
but speak of the perceived enemies of Islam in dehumanizing 
terms and justify killing them whenever necessary. If the Unit-
ed States could obtain personal jurisdiction against those who 
posted these videos and could prove the intent to instigate vio-
lence, the Black true threats doctrine would permit their prose-
cution. 
 
Trial, SUNDAY INDEP. (Ireland), Feb. 6, 2011. LaRose carried on extensive e-
mail conversations that incited, supported, and planned the murder of Swe-
dish cartoonist Lars Vilks for his depiction of Mohammed. Id. In 2007, the 
House of Representatives expressed the sentiment that owners of websites 
“should take action to remove jihadi propaganda.” H.R. Res. 224, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
 141. The most prominent group advocating pedophilia is North American 
Man-Boy Love Association. See Who We Are, NAMBLA, http://www.nambla 
.org/welcome.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 142. Gary Rivlin, Discomfort over Google Site’s Hate Forums, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Feb. 8, 2005, at 13 (describing Internet sites with a variety of hate con-
tent). 
 143. Kathryn Blaze Carlson, Muslim Group Backs Charges Against Ex-
tremists, NAT’L POST (Can.), July 10, 2010, at A5 (stating that following a five-
month investigation charges had been brought against an individual who had 
been posting calls for the mass murder of Jews). 
 144. Group Wants to Refute Against Anti-Obama Message, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 5, 2009, at 4 (mentioning sermons posted on the Internet advocating 
death to homosexuals). 
 145. See Weiner Calls for Removal of More than 700 Terrorist Videos on 
YouTube, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Oct. 24, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 21389375. 
 146. Attacks Carried Out in Nigeria, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, at A12 
(describing the terrorist attack in Kano, the largest city in the Northern part 
of Nigeria). For a representative set of videos with Imam Abubakar Shekau 
preaching, see YOUTUBE.COM (search “Boko Haram, Imam Abubakar 
Shekau”) (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). An English translation for one of the 
videos is also available. See Aaron Y. Zelin, New Video Message from Boko Ha-
ram’s (Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah li Da’wah wa-l-Jihad) Amir Imam Abu Bakr 
Shekau: “We Are Coming to Get You Jonathan”, JIHADOLOGY.NET (Apr. 12, 
2012), http://jihadology.net/2012/04/12/new-video-message-from-boko-harams 
-jamaat-ahl-al-sunnah-li-dawah-wa-l-jihad-amir-imam-abu-bakr-shekau-we 
-are-coming-to-get-you-jonathan/. 
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lic at large and not just persons with passwords. It therefore 
differs from the private rally scenario in Brandenburg. Spout-
ing destructive messages on a publicly accessible website, 
though it may not cause imminently dangerous outbursts, rais-
es safety concerns that differ from those arising at a small, pri-
vate rally. Even where there is no immediate incitement, the 
context, audience, and speaker’s intent can indicate that there 
is a true threat to a particular group. The intent of al-Awlaki 
and Shekau was to incite the public at large; their messages 
are so effective precisely because they pose short- and long-
term threats. 
Professor Cass Sunstein has pointed out the difficulty with 
applying the Brandenburg standard to incitement on mass me-
dia communications because only a handful out of millions of 
viewers might immediately commit violence.147
The true threats doctrine provides a framework for devel-
 And even this 
small segment of the audience might only be emboldened to act 
days, weeks, or even years after long-term indoctrination. Yet 
the intentional threats can pose a real danger to the targeted 
group, shifting the matter into the public realm, requiring po-
lice action. Internet advocacy of future murder, maiming, and 
other crimes creates risks beyond those recognized in Branden-
burg and are much closer in line with the true threats doctrine 
in Black. The question for the Court is whether the speaker 
meant a threat to be outrageous or intimidating. Messages 
purposefully posted at URLs are accessible by anyone, even us-
ers without knowledge of the individual, company, or organiza-
tion that posted the message, and therefore different than the 
privately attended rally from which Brandenburg arose. Those 
who would have heard of the speech through the news report 
would have received a filtered account rather than a message 
intentionally directed by the source of intimidation. The World 
Wide Web, as its name implies, is in large part, a public forum. 
The imminent threat of harm standard, therefore, is inapplica-
ble to most intentional threats made through the Internet. A 
more effective method of regulating Internet incitement, at 
least in cases where potential terrorism is involved, is to charge 
any site operators who intentionally mean to intimidate third 
persons. Purveyors of direct intimidation may be charged with 
material support of terrorism, discussed in Part III.D of this 
Article. 
 
 147. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
361, 370. 
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oping regulations capable of addressing some of the long-term 
dangers posted on the Web.148 The Court’s guidance in Black149
 
 148. I’ve written extensively on the subject of long-term harms from hate 
speech in TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 
 
130; see also Alexander 
Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 817 (2001). 
For a detailed discussion on the development of German antisemitism and 
its influence on Nazi politics, see JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, A CONCISE HISTORY 
OF NAZI GERMANY 141 (3d ed. 2007) (describing Nazi exploitation of tradition-
al European antisemitism); RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD 
REICH 27 (2003) (describing the interrelatedness of historical and modern 
antisemitism in Germany); SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE 
JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933–1939, at 3–4, 110, 324 (1997) (dis-
cussing the integration of European antisemitism in Nazi propaganda and its 
indoctrinating effect in Germany and Austria). 
The long-term effect of destructive messages is also evident from the Hutu 
slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda. See JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE 
KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK 55 (Linda Coverdale trans., 2005) (describing ra-
dio broadcasts openly calling for Tutsi destruction prior to the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONI-
ALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 212 (2001) (quoting from the 
Hutu-power Kangura newspaper, which dehumanized the Tutsis and called 
for their destruction); JOSIAS SEMUJANGA, ORIGINS OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
171–72 (2003) (providing an account of how racist ideology of the 1950s took 
root in Hutu politics and permeated the popular view of Tutsis). 
Likewise the Darfur genocide has been fueled by hate speech. Local au-
thorities have periodically paid for the writing and performance of hate songs 
to continue the instigation of the Janjaweed’s most recent onslaught against 
Darfurians. Censored Singer Tries to Reform ‘Hate Singers,’ FREEMUSE (June 
24, 2008), http://www.freemuse.org/sw28705.asp. According to an Amnesty In-
ternational report, one song’s lyrics were: 
The blood of the blacks runs like water 
we take their goods 
and we chase them from our area 
and our cattle will be in their land. 
The power of [Sudanese president Omer Hassan] al-Bashir 
belongs to the Arabs 
and we will kill you until the end, you blacks 
we have killed your God. 
Id. A woman’s song went: 
You are gorillas 
you are black 
and you are badly dressed 
Id. Such lyrics likely soothe the conscience of murderers, rapists, and torturers 
as they pillage blacks, seeking control of Sudan. This material was originally 
published in a Washington Post video news segment. Stephanie McCrummen, 
Songs of Hope for Sudan, When Censors Allow, WASH. POST (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/06/18/ 
ST2008061802936.html?sid=ST2008061802936. 
Also on the African continent Kenyan hate radio programs helped insti-
gate violence between the Kikuyu and Luo peoples. Kwamboka Oyaro, The 
  
1172 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1145 
 
is particularly helpful because even the most open calls for ter-
rorist violence may not seek to instigate immediate destruction. 
There is a significant contrast between the true threats doc-
trine and the imminent threat of harm test. In this regard, the 
fighting words doctrine, which the Court developed in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,150 is also virtually irrelevant to 
Internet communications.151 Fighting words statutes criminal-
ize personal attacks that are likely to incite an average person 
into “an immediate breach of the peace.”152 This doctrinal des-
ignation does not apply to intentionally threatening statements 
that are unlikely to provoke an immediate scuffle; merely an-
gering another is not enough. As we saw in Part I, the First 
Amendment protects individuals who make outrageous state-
ments, even when they severely upset observers’ feelings from 
a distance, as was the case with Snyder.153
The fighting words and incitement doctrines, then, are of 
very limited relevance to the Internet. The Court created them 
before communications capabilities of the World Wide Web 
were even foreseeable. Threats on the Internet—whether they 
are disseminated by a terrorist, supremacist group, or an indi-
vidual ethnocentrist—are unlikely to immediately instigate a 
 
 
Media Is Not Innocent, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www 
.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp? idnews=41049; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Tracing 
the Roots of Ethnic Violence in Kenya, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2008), http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18582319. Police have found 
leaflets inciting to violence, which Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo 
characterizes as intent on spreading “fear and panic,” being disseminated 
ahead of the 2013 election. Kenya Election: Hatred Leaflets in Kisumu and 
Mombasa, BBC (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world 
-africa-21544847; Kimaiyo Claims on BBC that Hate Speech Leaflets Are 
Spreading in the Country, KENYAN DAILY POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 5:59 AM), 
http://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/kimaiyo-claims-on-bbc-that-hate 
-speech.html; see also Drazen Jorgic, Kenya Tracks Facebook, Twitter for Elec-
tion “Hate Speech”, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2013/02/05/net-us-kenya-elections-socialmedia 
-idUSBRE9140IS20130205. 
And Turkish genocidal efforts against Armenians were also fueled by in-
tentionally degrading threats. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN 
WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY 
209–10 (2009) (discussing how longstanding Turkish prejudice played a cen-
tral role in the instigation of slaughter against Armenians). 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 106–21. 
 150. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1941). 
 151. I say “virtually irrelevant” because I can envision the unusual situa-
tion in which someone sends a combative text message to another in the same 
room and instigates a fist fight. 
 152. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 24–39. 
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fight. The opportunity to attack the selected target might either 
not be present or else be delayed for pragmatic reasons. Some-
one surfing the Web can encounter statements that might have 
led to a fight had they been uttered during the course of a prox-
imate confrontation, but when long distances separate the 
speaker and intended target it is likely that any pugilistic feel-
ings will dissipate, even if the two happen to meet at some dis-
tant point in the future. 
B. TRUE THREATS 
The applicability of the true threats doctrine to Internet 
communication has been woefully understudied. Even scholars 
who readily accept the doctrine’s constitutionality tend to avoid 
it when discussing the Brandenburg imminent threat of harm 
analysis. Astute First Amendment experts like Professors Da-
vid Strauss, Robert Post, and Eugene Volokh usually neglect to 
reflect on how the true threats doctrine qualifies the applicabil-
ity of Brandenburg.154
In some cases there will be no overlap between incitement 
and true threats doctrines. That is, in some circumstances they 
will relate to distinct forms of unprotected speech. Incitement 
requires intent to place another in imminent fear of harm,
 
155 
while true threats require only intent to threaten a specific and 
identifiable person or group.156
 
 154. Strauss typifies scholarly writing about the broad implications of the 
Brandenburg standard without specifying that it refers to statements made in 
private. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 54 (2010). In his 
discussion of the case, he makes no mention of the most recent case about 
cross burning, which found that a state cross burning statute with a mens rea 
component can be constitutional even without an imminent threat of harm 
component. See id. The same is true of Post’s recent chapter on hate speech 
which, written six years after the Black decision, made no mention of how that 
holding affected his central topic. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME 
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). So 
too Volokh, who has questioned the constitutionality of hate speech regulation 
but only once in the text of an article mentioned Black, and that in passing. 
See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1135–
36 (2005). Other than that, Volokh has only made reference to the case in 
string citations to three articles. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Intellectual Property, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 703 n.31 (2003); Eugene Volokh, 
Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
631, 670 n.171 (2006); Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political 
Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 295, 314 n.84 (2012). 
 I am interested here in cases 
where there is an overlap between the two; when an individual 
 155. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
 156. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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who threatens another is also trying to incite third parties to 
inflict harm on the victim. In the latter case, courts are faced 
with a circumstance where imminence is unnecessary to hold 
the speaker accountable for a true threat that is also likely to 
incite harmful behavior. Black involved a symbol, the burning 
cross,157 that can be adopted to intentionally threaten another 
and to incite others to commit hate crimes. In some situations, 
such as those that gave rise to the litigation in Black, there can 
be overlap between an incitement and a threatening symbol—
be it a cross, swastika, Hezbollah flag, al-Qaeda symbol, or 
some other statutorily defined hate symbol. Black was about an 
instance when there was an intent to threaten others through 
the use of symbolic speech that incited people to violence based 
on group defamations.158 But the true threats doctrine can be 
read more broadly than this. Although Black dealt only with in-
timidating symbolism, nothing in the opinion supports Profes-
sor Rebecca Tushnet’s recent claim that the Court treats imag-
es as more threatening than words.159
Some challenge the plurality’s premise in Black. Professor 
Steven Gey takes issue with Black for what he calls “the 
Court’s disturbing concession that governments may mete out 
overtly content-based sanctions on speech,” that is classified in 
the “unprotected category of ‘true threats.’”
 The key take away point 
from the case is that laws prohibiting intentional threats, be 
they oral or symbolic communications, are not protected by the 
First Amendment even when they limit the content of speakers 
messages. 
160 He is concerned 
that the true threats doctrine erodes some of the values in 
Brandenburg.161 Gey so strongly disagrees with content-based 
regulations on threats that to better make his point he dubs 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Black as “confused and confus-
ing.”162
 
 157. See id. at 347. 
 This claim, however, seems to be merely vitriolic. Even 
 158. See id. at 363. 
 159. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 697–98 (2012) (stating that the “burning cross—a 
symbol—was understood to constitute essentially an explicit threat, allowing 
the state to ban cross-burning carried out for the purposes of intimidation. 
Words, however vicious, would have had difficulty carrying the same threaten-
ing power as the flaming cross”). 
 160. Gey, Questions About Cross Burning, supra note 10, at 1324. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amend-
ments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 1006 (2010) [hereinafter Gey, The Branden-
burg Paradigm]. 
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the dissent in Black believed the state can regulate cross burn-
ing without violating the First Amendment but thought that 
the Virginia statute was overbroad because it punished more 
than just “particularly virulent” forms of proscribable commu-
nications.163
Gey is especially disturbed by the Black plurality’s opinion 
because he believes it departs from the iconic Brandenburg 
standard by embracing Virginia’s prohibition against a disfa-
vored group’s political message.
 
164 This claim is, however, un-
justified because in her opinion O’Connor does not focus on the 
Klan as a politically disfavored group but rather its use of sym-
bols to threaten the public.165 While Gey calls her opinion 
“schizophrenic,”166 the opinion established and applied a con-
sistent scienter standard. Indeed, O’Connor overturned one of 
the convictions the Court considered in the two consolidated 
cases composing Black, remanding that matter to the state be-
cause the prosecution failed to prove the intent to intimidate.167 
Black is as consistent as the general protection on labor picket-
ing that does not hold true when it involves “intimidation, and 
reprisal or threats thereof.”168 In both circumstances, the right 
to free speech is held to be sacrosanct, but not when it involves 
the use of intentional threats. Intimidating uses of symbols 
that are linked to violence, such as burning crosses, are very 
different from the picketing in Snyder or the outrageous speech 
in Entertainment Merchants and Stevens.169
Unlike Gey, I do not believe the Court’s reasoning in Black 
to be inconsistent with Brandenburg’s; instead, it clarified the 
reach of the earlier opinion. Rather than adopting the Bran-
 
 
 163. Black, 538 U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 164. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm, supra note 162, at 1007. 
 165. Black, 538 U.S. at 352–57 (plurality opinion) (expostulating on the 
Klan’s long history of violence). 
 166. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm, supra note 162, at 1007. 
 167. Gey misstates that the reason why the Court overturned Black’s con-
viction was that it found his burning a cross to be “entirely political.” Id. at 
1007–08. But that was not the rational of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion. 
She explained, instead, that the conviction had to be overturned because the 
trial judge had wrongly instructed the jury to presume Black’s intent rather 
than deliberate on whether the prosecution had proven that state of mind be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Black, 538 U.S. at 349–50, 367. 
 168. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960) (interpret-
ing the National Labor Relations Act as it was amended by the Taft-Hartley 
Act). 
 169. See discussion of cases supra Part I. 
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denburg imminence standard, Black defined true threats to be 
“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vi-
olence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”170 The 
prohibition against true threats prevents speakers from dis-
turbing the public peace by intentionally placing others in fear 
of danger.171 Both cases involved defendants who had burned 
crosses, but there were material differences between them. In 
Brandenburg, police officers arrested a Klan member for burn-
ing a cross at a private gathering that was only attended by in-
vitees.172 Black, on the other hand, involved the arrest of indi-
viduals who had burned crosses in plain sight of third 
parties.173
Not only is Professor Gey critical of the holding in Black, 
he denies its gloss on Brandenburg’s imminent threat of harm 
 Only in Black, therefore, was the Court faced with a 
situation in which intimidation was aimed at persons unin-
volved in the Klan ritual. For an intimidation statute to survive 
constitutional challenge, then, it must include public statement 
and intent components. The intimidation in Black was overt, 
while in Brandenburg the burning cross was a symbol of group 
unity. 
 
 170. Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
 171. Id. at 360 (“Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individu-
als from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in 
addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will occur.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992))). 
 172. The defendant in Brandenburg called a reporter of a Cincinnati televi-
sion station to come to a Klan rally. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 
(1969) (per curiam). The reporter arrived to the event with a cameraman who 
filmed the proceedings. Id. 
 173. Black involved convictions for violating the Virginia cross burning 
statute, prohibiting anyone from burning a cross to intentionally intimidate a 
person or group of persons. Black, 538 U.S. at 348. The prosecution had se-
cured one of the felony convictions against a defendant who burned a cross on 
private property but in a location that was visible from a public road. Cars ob-
served the cross burning and a few of the travelers asked a sheriff about it. Id. 
A white woman who witnessed the rally from her property, adjacent to the ral-
ly felt “very . . . scared” when she heard speakers discussing shooting blacks. 
Id.; Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 749 (Va. 2001) (noting that the witness, 
Rebecca Sechrist “stated: ‘I was scared our home would get burned or some-
thing would happen to it. We’ve got two . . . kids and I was afraid that some-
thing would happen to them.’ In response to a question by defendant’s counsel, 
Sechrist testified: ‘I think they were trying to scare me.’”). The Supreme Court 
of Virginia consolidated this case with an unrelated matter regarding three 
individuals who tried to burn a cross in the yard of a black man to vindicate a 
personal vendetta. Black, 538 U.S. at 350–51. The victim felt “very nervous” 
when he came across the burned cross by his house, not knowing whether this 
was only the first step of an escalating situation. Id. at 350.  
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test. He writes that, even after Black, political advocacy con-
tinues to be protected unless it poses an immediate threat of a 
concrete harm “and the speaker intends his or her speech to in-
stigate the immediate harm.”174 This is a common mistake. Pro-
fessor Daniel Farber likewise elides the true threats doctrine 
with the imminent threat of harm criterion.175 But Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion said nothing of the kind. In fact, one of the 
prosecution’s key witnesses saw the burning cross from afar, on 
her in-laws’ lawn, and others noticed it while driving on an ad-
jacent road.176 This spectacle by no means caused an imminent 
threat of harm, but liability could nevertheless attach if it was 
intentionally meant to threaten observers. A majority of the 
Court, with Justice Scalia joining in concurrence177 and Justice 
Thomas in agreement about this aspect despite dissenting on 
other grounds,178
While Black involved only one type of intimidating symbol, 
the decision’s underlying finding can readily be extended to 
other symbols—like the swastika, Hamas flag, Sri Lankan 
Tamil Tiger Emblem, and such—used by organizations adher-
ing to violent ideologies and justifying terrorism.
 regarded intimidation to be enough for convic-
tion irrespective of whether witnesses sensed any imminent 
threat of harm. 
179
 
 174. Gey, Questions About Cross Burning, supra note 
 Context is 
10, at 1294 (stating 
that one of the central First Amendment issues “involves the bedrock principle 
that political advocacy is protected from government regulation unless the ad-
vocacy takes the form of incitement, the advocacy occurs in a context where an 
immediate concrete harm follows from the speech in question, and the speaker 
intends his or her speech to instigate the immediate harm”). 
 175. Farber, supra note 10, at 925 (“Although Virginia v. Black represents 
the Court’s official recognition of true threats as unprotected and its first defi-
nition of the category’s boundaries, it can hardly be viewed as a surprise that 
the government is entitled to prevent individuals from threatening an individ-
ual or the public with immediate violence.”). 
 176. Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
 177. Justice Scalia concurred because he, unlike the plurality, believed 
that the Virginia statute’s prima facie presumption of intentional intimidation 
was constitutional. Id. at 368–71 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 178. Justice Thomas argued in the dissent to Black that cross burning was 
intrinsically intimidating, which contradicted the plurality’s view that some 
forms of cross burning could be expressive and implicate First Amendment 
coverage. Id. at 388–400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 179. Cf. Alexander Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate 
Speech Codes, 43 CONN. L. REV. 617, 666 n.295 (2010) (“The Hamas flag is just 
as ideologically violent as the swastika.”); Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and 
Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 497, 503–04 (2009) (“Destructive messages are particularly dangerous 
when they rely on historically established symbolism, such as burning crosses 
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important here because it reveals whether the message is only 
meant to trigger angst and outrage, in which case it would not 
be actionable, or intended to be a true threat. 
C. GROUP DEFAMATION 
Black is among those cases in which the Court determined 
that public interest trumped the right to express inciting 
statements.180 This deliberation about social harm arising from 
expressive conduct belies Alvarez’s claim that balancing other 
social interests against speech is impermissible.181 Another set 
of cases, dealing with group defamations, permit state limits on 
speech threatening public order and specifically designed to 
protect individuals and groups against reputational harms.182 
Like the true threats cases, defamation laws do not adhere to 
categorical notions of the First Amendment. Both are con-
cerned with statements made for public consumption, while 
Brandenburg was about statements communicated during a 
meeting of like-minded individuals and their guests who were 
not intending to intimidate anyone at the gathering. The group 
defamation doctrine and true threats doctrines are not, howev-
er, identical. Group defamation statutes punish the written and 
oral communications of discriminatory stereotypes that are 
likely to instigate public disturbances,183
 
or swastikas, in order to kindle widely shared prejudices.”); Alexander Tsesis, 
The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543 (2002) (discussing the cultural significance of Confed-
erate symbols placed on state property); Richard L. Wiener & Erin Richter, 
Symbolic Hate: Intention to Intimidate, Political Ideology, and Group Associa-
tion, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 463, 475 (2008) (discussing an empirical study 
that found that participants thought the display of symbols like swastikas, 
burning crosses, and skin fists to be intimidating); Timothy Zick, Cross Burn-
ing, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment Eth-
nography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2291 (2004) (“There can be little 
doubt that the swastika is as intimidating to some as the burning cross.”). 
 while true threats 
statutes punish intentional intimidation. 
 180. Helen Norton has recently explained that government hate speech 
may also violate Equal Protection principles. See Helen Norton, The Equal 
Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 159, 163 (2012). 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
 182. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 1605–09. 
 183. In Beauharnais, the Court found that an Illinois group defamation 
statute did not violate the First Amendment because it was drafted not as “a 
catchall” but specifically directed “at a defined evil” to punish the use of racist 
and antisemitic epithets that were “productive of breach of the peace or riots.” 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 253 (1952). 
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In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Court upheld a state statute 
criminalizing group libel that “portrays depravity, criminali-
ty . . . or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, 
creed or religion” and exposes those citizens to “contempt, deri-
sion, or obloquy.”184
In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court limited the types 
of expressions that qualify to those that offend “our basic con-
cept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”
 Consistent with the holding in Beauhar-
nais, group defamations can further be extended to revilement 
based on ethnicity, nationality, alienage, gender, or sexual ori-
entation. 
185 
Judicial review of group defamation statutes, then, must con-
sider the specific statement’s potential to disrupt the public 
peace and the public policy’s connection to essential concepts of 
dignity and human worth. Proving group defamation, like its 
common law tort counterpart, does not require a showing of 
clear and present danger because the speech involved is not 
constitutionally protected.186
The Beauharnais decision has been roundly criticized by a 
variety of First Amendment scholars. Several of its detractors 
believe Beauharnais is no longer good law. Professor Jonathan 
D. Varat, for one, thinks that “[t]here is good reason to believe 
that today the First Amendment would bar an action for group 
libel, as distinct from individual libel.”
 
187
 
 184. Id. at 251 (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949)). 
 Varat explains that 
the danger with punishing libel is that suppression of “lies” 
 185. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). That standard of dignity resembles the approach that 
other countries extend beyond injuries to private reputation. For instance, 
Germany prohibits the distribution of “written materials . . . which describe 
cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence against humans . . . in a manner 
expressing glorification or which downplays such acts of violence or which rep-
resents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the event in a manner which violates 
human dignity.” STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Dec. 2007, § 131(1) 
(Ger.), translated in THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION 116 (Michael Bohlander trans., 2008). 
 186. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266 (“Libelous utterances not being 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either 
for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear 
and present danger.’”). 
 187. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, 
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1116 
(2006). 
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runs the risk of silencing despised speakers.188
Varat’s arguments against group defamation seem plausi-
ble at first glance because protection of unpopular speakers is 
at the core of free speech doctrine. His point is, nevertheless, 
misguided because it ignores that society has determined that 
the dignitary harms suffered by defamed parties distinguish 
group stereotypes from innocuous lies,
 He is concerned 
that group defamation prosecutions will infringe on self-
expression. 
189 such as false claims 
about military honors.190 Earlier in this paper, I pointed out 
that the Court has determined that protecting the public from 
the dangers of menacing racist symbols outweighs a speaker’s 
interest in threateningly displaying them.191 The Court has up-
held some other laws limiting speech because they are likely to 
mislead listeners. The element of deception is also intrinsic to 
the regulation of false advertisements192 and trademark viola-
tions.193 Here, as in cases of group defamation, the public’s in-
terest in receiving accurate information receives greater judi-
cial consideration than the private right to make false 
statements.194
 
 188. Id. at 1116–17. 
 
 189. I am drawing an analogy from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s “con-
cern for dignitary harms,” which, as Professor Karst has pointed out in a dif-
ferent context, “bears a strong family resemblance to the concerns of modern 
equal protection doctrine as applied to discrimination against ‘outsiders’ in 
other categories of self-identity, such as race or sex or sexual orientation.” 
Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 368. 
 190. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (holding the Stolen Valor Act to be unconstitutional for criminalizing 
falsely claiming to have received military honors); see also Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Where's the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1091, 1091 n.2 (2008) (“The State may only punish deliberate 
falsehoods when they cause significant harms to individuals.”). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 105–14. 
 192. See, e.g., Persaud Cos. v. IBCS Grp., Inc., 425 F. App’x 223, 227 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (finding that a marketing brochure satisfied “the statutory re-
quirements of a false advertisement” because “it [was]—at a minimum—
misleading or deceptive”); Telebrands Corp. v. F.T.C., 457 F.3d 354, 356 n.4 
(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission Act’s provision 
against deceptive acts that affect interstate commerce). 
 193. See, e.g., Buetow v. A.L.S. Enter., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 
2011) (stating that “deception is material” to a false advertising claim under 
the Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946)). 
 194. See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) (stating that 
there is no protection on “trade-marks which deceive the public” even if “mem-
bers of the trade are not misled”); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1172 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the public has a 
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Varat’s definition of group defamation—as only dealing 
with deceptive statements195—is, moreover, too narrow. Group 
defamation is further concerned with maintaining public order 
and protecting vulnerable individuals from targeted harm.196 At 
bottom, defamatory statements directed at a particular group, 
especially when they incorporate historical prejudices and bias-
es, can be regulated because they result in reputational harms, 
not merely because they are hyperbolic or misleading.197
A different line of academic attack against Beauharnais 
presumes it has been superseded by subsequent decisions. 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky takes this approach. He speculates 
that “Beauharnais almost certainly would be declared unconsti-
tutional today based on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.”
 
198 
Professor Rodney Smolla more unequivocally asserts that, 
“Beauharnais is flatly inconsistent with modern First Amend-
ment doctrines restraining content-based and view-point based 
discrimination.”199 Professor Nadine Strossen, former president 
of the American Civil Liberties Union, similarly states that 
“[t]he group defamation concept . . . has been thoroughly dis-
credited.”200
 
right to be protected against false advertisement); Ford v. NYLCare Health 
Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 339 (5th Cir. 2002) (Benavides, J., con-
curring) (same); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(“[T]rademark protection . . . precludes competitors only from using marks 
that are likely to confuse or deceive the public.”). 
 Strossen’s perspective is informed by Professor 
 195. See Varat, supra note 187, at 116–19 (discussing whether Holocaust 
deniers have First Amendment protection). 
 196. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952). 
 197. In his concurrence to Rosenblatt v. Baer, Justice Potter Stewart ex-
plained interests protected by defamation laws: 
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjus-
tified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic con-
cept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a con-
cept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection 
of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily 
to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But 
this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by 
this Court as a basic of our constitutional system. 
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 198. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 978. Professor Ronald K. L. Collins is 
also reticent, writing that today group libel laws “are deemed constitutionally 
suspect.” Ronald K. L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, & the First Amend-
ment. . . in Ohio, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000). 
 199. Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Inju-
ry”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech 
Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 351 (2009). 
 200. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Pro-
posal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 517. 
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Laurence H. Tribe’s more qualified observation that:  
New York Times v. Sullivan201 seemed to some to eclipse Beauharnais’ 
sensitivity to . . . group defamation claims . . . because New York 
Times [v. Sullivan] required public officials bringing libel suits to 
prove that a defamatory statement was directed at the official per-
sonally, and not simply at a unit of government.202
Popular as these claims are, they do not hold up to precedential 
scrutiny. These statements are contrary to several major Su-
preme Court opinions that cite to Beauharnais for its preceden-
tial value.
 
203
Academics who presume Sullivan obliterated the holding 
in Beauharnais often follow a Seventh Circuit mistake in Amer-
ican Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.
 
204 In Sullivan, the Court 
ruled that for a public figure to prevail in a suit for defamation, 
she must prove that the offensive statement in question was 
made with actual malice.205 One of Hudnut’s defenders mistak-
enly stated that the “doctrinal tides that have swept libel in 
general into the First Amendment ocean” in the wake of Sulli-
van “have left Beauharnais . . . high and dry.”206
 
 201. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 That state-
ment closely tracks the Hudnut opinion’s erroneous dictum 
that “cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan,” which set a 
high burden of proof for public officials seeking redress for def-
amation, “[have] so washed away the foundations of Beauhar-
 202. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-17, at 
926–27 (2d ed. 1988). 
 203. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2561 (2012) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “many kinds of false factual statements have long 
been proscribed without raising any Constitutional problem.” (internal quota-
tions omitted)); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citing 
to Beauharnais as an example of one of the few exceptions to the general pro-
hibitions against content based regulations on speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (drawing attention to cases like Beauhar-
nais, dealing with “traditional limitations” that do not offend First Amend-
ment protections on free speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(stating that group libel falls outside the First Amendment “despite this 
Court’s references to a marketplace of ideas”). 
 204. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 205. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees re-
quire . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages 
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ . . . .”). 
 206. Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove 
the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It 
Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Ap-
proach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group 
Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 950 (1996). 
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nais that it [can no longer] be considered authoritative.”207 Just 
as forcefully but misleadingly, Judge Richard Posner in another 
Seventh Circuit decision wrote, even “though Beauharnais v. 
Illinois has never been overruled, no one thinks the First 
Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defama-
tion to be prohibited.”208
To begin, the Court has repeatedly and approvingly cited to 
Beauharnais as controlling precedent on the constitutionality of 
defamation law. As recently as 2010, in a case discussed in Part 
I of this Article, the Supreme Court determined that Beauhar-
nais is one of several lines of cases that permit restrictions on 
the content of speech without violating the First Amendment.
 This presumption has never been sup-
ported by the Supreme Court; to the contrary, the justices have 
shown every sign that the diametrically opposite is true. 
209 
Furthermore, in 2012 three Justices in dissent reiterated that 
Beauharnais continues to be binding authority.210 In an earlier 
case, the Supreme Court cited Beauharnais to demonstrate the 
proposition that libel is among the “categories of communica-
tion and certain special utterances to which the majestic pro-
tection of the First Amendment does not extend.”211
Furthermore, at least two Supreme Court justices raised 
concerns with the Seventh Circuit’s presumptuousness that 
Beauharnais has been overruled. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 
joined by Justice Byron R. White, wrote an unusual dissent to a 
denial of certiorari in Smith v. Collin.
 
212 Petitioners had sought 
a writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals holding unconsti-
tutional an ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of ha-
tred.213 “[T]he Seventh Circuit’s decision is in some tension with 
Beauharnais,” Blackmun asserted; “[t]hat case has not been 
overruled or formally limited in any way.”214
 
 207. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331 n.3. 
 Subsequent Su-
preme Court majority opinions have borne out the legitimacy of 
 208. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 
668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 209. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). Even R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, a case that is often cited by the opponents of inflammatory 
speech regulation, referred to Beauharnais as an example of a legitimate gov-
ernment regulation against speech based on content. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 210. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2561 (2012) (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
 211. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984). 
 212. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 213. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 214. Smith, 439 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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group defamation limitations on incitement.215
The Seventh Circuit’s underlying error was to misconstrue 
Sullivan as an abandonment of Beauharnais rather than a 
qualification of it. Sullivan, which we saw earlier, set a high 
burden of proof for public officials suing for defamation, only 
impacted the holding of Beauharnais as it applies to public fig-
ures. Based on the many Supreme Court cases that continue to 
cite Beauharnais in the context of simple defamation,
 
216 Sulli-
van’s actual malice standard does not apply to private group 
defamation cases. The Supreme Court recognized this distinc-
tion between the two in New York v. Ferber, asserting that 
Beauharnais remains the controlling precedent on the publica-
tion of group libel except in cases “when public officials are the 
target[s].”217 Even post-Sullivan, therefore, a state can crimi-
nalize portrayals that tend to subject “a class of citizens, of any 
race, color, creed, or religion” to “contempt, derision, or oblo-
quy.”218 In such circumstances, private plaintiffs must prove 
that defendants negligently made a false statement that caused 
harm to the reputation or standing of a protected group.219
Despite the Supreme Court’s regular reliance on Beauhar-
 But 
in cases of public group defamation, Sullivan qualifies Beau-
harnais to require proof of actual malice. 
 
 215. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (“From 1791 to 
the present . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the con-
tent of speech in a few limited areas, and has never include[d] a freedom to 
disregard these traditional limitations. These historic and traditional catego-
ries . . . includ[e] obscenity [and] defamation . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) 
(“We have recognized that ‘the freedom of speech’ referred to by the First 
Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limita-
tions.”); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504 (“[T]here are categories of communication 
and certain special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First 
Amendment does not extend . . . . Libelous speech has been held to constitute 
one such category.”). 
 216. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text. 
 217. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (citing Sullivan and 
Beauharnais for the proposition that, “[l]eaving aside the special considera-
tions when public officials are the target, a libelous publication is not protect-
ed by the Constitution”). 
 218. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270–71 (1952) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (quoting an Illinois group defamation statute). 
 219. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974) (stating that states 
cannot impose strict liability). The Court stressed in Gertz that injuries in def-
amation cases typically involved the “impairment of reputation and standing 
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” 
Id. at 350. Defamation can lead monetary loss, but it is not a prerequisite for 
standing. Id. 
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nais for its precedential value, Professor Calvin R. Masey as-
serts that “the group libel concept has been thoroughly discred-
ited.”220 Masey bases this claim on the four dissents to the case, 
even though the justices who wrote them did not convince the 
majority.221 Be that as it may, three of four dissents did not 
dismiss group defamation out of hand as a categorical in-
fringement on speech.222 Only one of the dissenting Justices, 
Hugo Black, entirely rejected the constitutionality of group def-
amation statutes.223
The other three dissenters conceded that group defamation 
could be actionable under certain circumstances, but disagreed 
with the majority’s judgment of the case.
 
224
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which was 
aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and 
obloquy. I would be willing to concede that such conduct directed at a 
race or group in this country could be made an indictable offense.
 In his dissent, Jus-
tice William O. Douglas acknowledged that the Nazi success of 
manipulating the population through antisemitic propaganda 
demonstrated that group defamation, particularly when it is in-
tentional, has the potential of causing widespread harms: 
225
In another dissenting opinion to Beauharnais, Justice Robert 
Jackson recognized that the government had authority to enact 
a group libel statute but did not join the majority because he 
believed that Beauharnais did not receive an adequate oppor-
tunity to proffer his defense at trial.
 
226
 
 220. Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Founda-
tional Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 142 n.164 (1992). 
 Finally, Justice Stanley 
Reed asserted that group defamation statutes could only be 
constitutional if they included a culpability element to prove 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (assuming a 
state may “pass group libel laws to protect the public peace”); id. at 284 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (arguing that Nazi propaganda in Hitler Germany “could be 
made an indictable offense”); id. at 299 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with 
the majority that a state can protect minorities under its libel laws). 
 223. Id. at 274–75 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 279 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“It is when speech becomes an in-
citement to crime that the right freely to exhort may be abridged.”); id. at 284–
85 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“My view is that if in any case other public inter-
ests are to override the plain command of the First Amendment, the peril of 
speech must be clear and present . . . .”); id. at 288 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the First 
Amendment). 
 225. Id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 299–301 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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incitement.227 That element, for criminal cases, could be sup-
plied by the actual malice element that I suggested earlier for 
public defamation or the scienter element Justice O’Connor re-
quired in Virginia v. Black.228 A close assessment of the dis-
sents, therefore, indicates that eight of nine justices agreed 
that Illinois had a public reason for prohibiting group defama-
tion. Justice Douglas specifically tied reputational harms to the 
threat of physical harm; thereby implicitly linking restraints on 
group defamation and true threats.229
 
 227. See id. at 279, 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to free 
speech can be abridged “when speech becomes an incitement to crime,” but the 
relevant criminal statute must “be reasonably well defined”). Justice Reed’s 
test is close to the one that the Court later adopted in Virginia v. Black. See 
supra text accompanying notes 
 
104–09. 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 229. This use of terminology is, of course, anachronistic. Watts, the initial 
source of the true threats doctrine, was not decided until seventeen years after 
Beauharnais. Compare Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), with 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Nevertheless, I think my point 
about Douglas’s sense that intentional threats are linked to group defamation 
is analytically correct. 
Sociological studies bear this point out. Renowned psychologist Gordon W. 
Allport described how “prolonged and intense verbal hostility always precedes 
a riot.” GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 60 (1979). Precon-
ceived animosities are intrinsic to hate crimes. Since medieval times, mobs 
have often accused Jews of kidnapping Christian children, crucifying them, 
and using their blood as an ingredient in Passover matzah. MAX I. DIMONT, 
JEWS, GOD AND HISTORY 240–41 (2d ed. 2004); RAPHAEL ISRAELI, POISON: 
MODERN MANIFESTATIONS OF A BLOOD LIBEL 21 (2002). This myth and other 
antisemitic propaganda were often repeated to incite nationalistic mobs. EMIL 
MURAD, THE QUAGMIRE 252 (1998); TADEUSZ PIOTROWSKI, POLAND’S HOLO-
CAUST: ETHNIC STRIFE, COLLABORATION WITH OCCUPYING FORCES AND GENO-
CIDE IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1918–1947, at 135 (1998). 
On the North American continent, aborigines were commonly reputed to 
be brutal savages who killed frontier people, and this pernicious stereotype 
was used to rationalize land misappropriation. BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND 
SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO 
DARFUR 318–30 (2007). Lynch mobs in the United States were often riled up 
by allegations of arson, or that a black man had raped a white woman or a 
black man had argued with a white man. JAMES H. MADISON, A LYNCHING IN 
THE HEARTLAND: RACE AND MEMORY IN AMERICA 67–68 (2001); STEWART E. 
TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN 
LYNCHINGS, 1882–1930, at 47 (1995). These accusations were unquestioned by 
riotous crowds of individuals or white Southern men inside and outside the 
legal system. Peter W. Bardaglio, Rape and the Law in the Old South: “Calcu-
lated to Excite Indignation in Every Heart”, 60 J. S. HIST. 749, 752 (1994); 
James W. Vander Zanden, The Ideology of White Supremacy, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 
385, 401 (1959). During the Second World War Japanese Americans living on 
the West Coast were interned after being labeled spies who were inimical to 
the United States’ war efforts. JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 262–65, 302 (1954); TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, 
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Professor Jeremy Waldron, who has recently argued that 
U.S. law should permit the regulation of group defamation,230 
has raised pragmatic doubt about whether the current mem-
bers of the Court would uphold the conviction of Joseph Beau-
harnais.231 He may well be correct, but that question is unan-
swerable without a litigant bringing a direct challenge. What 
we know is that regular citations to the case in majority opin-
ions indicate that at least several justices continue to regard 
Beauharnais to be good law.232 Waldron is correct that the need 
to regulate defamation is ultimately a question of principle, not 
merely doctrinal consistency. Existing doctrine, I believe, al-
lows for the regulation of group defamation when it threatens 
public safety.233
D. MATERIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS 
 
Given this jurisprudential trajectory, it was logical for the 
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project to uphold a fed-
 
supra note 130, at 102. Democratic processes in states like California and 
Washington were hijacked by anti-Japanese groups who lobbied for the en-
forcement of discriminatory laws and internment. ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN 
AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 116–
19, 138 (1988). The democratic electoral system was also no barrier in Rwan-
da, where genocide followed repeated radio statements calling for the extermi-
nation of the Tutsi minority. Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in 
Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 41, 42–43 (Allan 
Thompson ed., 2007); Darryl Li, Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio 
and Genocide in Rwanda, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 90, 97–
98 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007). 
 230. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 4 (2012) (arguing that 
hate speech undermines the “sense of security in the space we all inhabit”). 
 231. See id. at 64 (quoting Judge Posner that “no one thinks that the First 
Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be pro-
hibited” (citing Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 
672 (7th Cir. 2008))). 
 232. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (affirming 
that speech can be limited in certain circumstances where that freedom is 
outweighed by moral considerations); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 
(1964) (recognizing that group vilification which could lead to public disorder 
may not be protected under the First Amendment). 
 233. Waldron emphasizes that hate speech harms the targeted person’s 
dignitary interests. WALDRON, supra note 230, at 103. The scope of this Article 
does not allow me to expand on his thesis. Ultimately, I believe that hate 
speech and group defamation are actionable because they attack more than 
dignitary interests. Hate speech is essential to catalyzing mass discrimination 
and violence. In a previous article, I demonstrated this point through notori-
ous, historical examples. Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate 
Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 741–59 (2000). 
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eral statute prohibiting anyone from providing “material sup-
port or resources” to groups the Secretary of State designated 
as foreign terrorist organizations.234 The challenge was brought 
by U.S. nonprofit organizations that sought to provide the 
Kurdish Workers’ Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam with training about international law, political partici-
pation, and international organization.235 At face value, these 
activities were not outrageous and arguably involved no direct 
incitement. The Court found the context of transmitting infor-
mation to dangerous terrorists to be determinative.236
The statute implicated public safety and free speech con-
cerns. As part of its definition of material support, the law re-
stricted an individual’s expressive right to provide “expert ad-
vice or assistance” to any designated organization.
 
237 A 
factfinder inquiring into whether a defendant engaged in pro-
hibited communication with a designated terrorist organization 
must evaluate the content of the communication to determine 
whether it falls under the material support statute.238
 
 234. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). It is a felony to knowingly provide, at-
tempt, or conspire to provide “material support or resources to a foreign terror-
ist organization.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2006). The statute defined “material 
support or resources” to include “property, tangible or intangible, or service, 
including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false doc-
umentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, 
lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . ., and transportation, except medi-
cine or religious materials[.]” § 2339A(b)(1). 
 What 
may be advice in some circumstances may be no more than 
mass-advertisement-gone-to-the-wrong-address in another. 
Think, for instance, of an individual who specifically addresses 
an advisory pamphlet about the art of negotiation to a terrorist 
group as opposed to an individual who inadvertently sends a 
mass mailing about negotiations to the terrorist organization 
along with a slew of other recipients. Under the statute, only 
 235. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2716. 
 236. See id. at 2724–25 (finding that there is no way to distinguish between 
helping terrorist groups with legitimate activities compared to illegal terrorist 
activities). 
 237. § 2339B(g)(4). Among the groups designated terrorist organizations 
are Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, Hizballah, Jemaah Islamiya 
Organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Palestine Liberation Front, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Real IRA. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN 
TERRORIST ORGS., available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
45323.pdf. 
 238. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720 (“Of course, the 
scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application.”). 
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the former conduct is actionable because the content is advisory 
rather than commercial. 
To limit the risk of wrongful convictions, Congress included 
a mental state component in the material support statute. No 
violation could occur unless the person providing the support 
had “knowledge of the foreign group’s designation as a terrorist 
organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts.”239 An-
yone knowingly contributing to a terrorist group was subject to 
fifteen years in prison or up to life imprisonment if death re-
sulted from such support.240 HLP, then, dealt with a law entire-
ly different than the outrage laws found unconstitutional in 
Snyder and Entertainment Merchants.241
In HLP, as with true threats and group defamations deci-
sions I assessed earlier,
 
242 the public welfare concerns were 
grave enough to counterbalance the interest in self-expression. 
As with the other two categories, in HLP the Court did not rely 
on strict scrutiny analysis, with its demand for narrow tailor-
ing.243 The limits on speech in the context of all three catego-
ries, indicates that scholars like Eugene Volokh are mistaken 
to assert that HLP is the “only non-overruled majority opinion 
upholding a content-based speech restriction under strict scru-
tiny.”244 HLP is not alone in upholding a restriction on content 
based restraints against incitement tending to create public 
disorder and violence. Black was about the power of a state to 
punish intentional threats relying on menacing symbols like 
burning crosses,245
 
 239. Id. at 2715. 
 Beauharnais was about the power of the 
state to punish the use of racist and antisemitic statements to 
 240. § 2339B(a)(1). 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 60–64. 
 242. See supra Part III.B (assessing the doctrine of true threats); Part III.C 
(assessing the doctrine of group defamations). 
 243. The dissent explicitly made this point. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]here, as here, a statute applies 
criminal penalties and at least arguably does so on the basis of content-based 
distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize the statute and justifications 
‘strictly’—to determine whether the prohibition is justified by a ‘compelling’ 
need that cannot be ‘less restrictively’ accommodated.”). 
 244. Eugene Volokh, Humanitarian Law Project and Strict Scrutiny, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/ 
humanitarian-law-project-and-strict-scrutiny/ [hereinafter Volokh, HLP Post 
1] (subsequently updated in Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terror-
ist Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 
2010, 5:43 PM) http://www.volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign 
-terrorist-organizations-and-strict-scrutiny/ [hereinafter Volokh, HLP Post 2]). 
 245. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 358, 360 (2003). 
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defame groups,246 and HLP involved expert advice for empower-
ing terrorist organizations247
Volokh also reads narrow tailoring into the HLP majority’s 
opinion, something that even the dissent did not do.
: all of these subjects are content-
rich. 
248 The clos-
est the Court came to this formulation was to adopt an amor-
phous “more rigorous scrutiny” than the intermediate scrutiny 
test.249 Even assuming that Volokh is correct and this is an al-
ternative formulation, albeit an ambiguous one, of strict scruti-
ny, the majority would likely nevertheless view the public dan-
ger of legitimizing terror to be compelling. Criminal liability 
arises from only “a narrow category of speech to, under the di-
rection of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the 
speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.”250 The majority 
found that the fungibility of money in a terrorist organization’s 
control, with no “firewalls” preventing charitable contributions 
from being funneled toward violent activities,251 rendered the 
complete bar of material support narrow under the circum-
stances. Even seemingly benign support for an organization 
could further its ability to wreak violent, political havoc.252
 
 246. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252, 258–59. 
 Ad-
vice given about leverage through dialogue, which is what Hu-
manitarian Law Project sought to provide, could therefore 
strengthen a terrorist organization’s ability to make demands 
at the negotiation table. Although the specific advice the Hu-
 247. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2715, 2730 (majority opin-
ion). 
 248. See Volokh, HLP Post 1, supra note 244 (“I’m inclined to say that this 
is indeed [narrowly tailored]—especially since the Court’s precedents call for 
strict scrutiny of content-based speech restrictions—though the dissent rea-
sonably notes that the majority is not entirely clear on this.”). But see Volokh, 
HLP Post 2 (noting that the “Court doesn’t really define the test precisely” and 
questioning whether the speech restriction is narrowly tailored). In his dissent 
Justice Breyer did the opposite, at one point challenging the majority’s as-
sumption that strict scrutiny does not apply. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if we assume for argument’s sa-
ke that ‘strict scrutiny’ does not apply, no one can deny that we must at the 
very least ‘measure the validity of the means adopted by Congress against 
both the goal it has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First 
Amendment.’”). 
 249. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24 (majority opinion). 
 250. Id. at 2723. 
 251. Id. at 2725–26. 
 252. See infra note 267 (discussing why the fungible nature of money 
makes any, including ostensibly peaceful, contribution to terrorist organiza-
tions likely to increase terror activities). 
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manitarian Law Project sought to provide terrorists was not di-
rectly translatable into violence, the Court found ample evi-
dence that “material support of a terrorist group’s lawful activi-
ties facilitates the group’s ability to attract ‘funds,’ ‘financing,’ 
and ‘goods’ that will further its terrorist acts.”253
Viewed in concert, the holdings in Black, Beauharnais, and 
HLP indicate that the Court is deferential to the regulation of 
speech for a limited number of public safety purposes. The pub-
lic safety policies involved in these three cases were inapplica-
ble to the offensive speech cases reviewed in Part I of this Arti-
cle. HLP did differ from the other two incitement cases in its 
reference to a “more rigorous scrutiny” while never adopting 
any comparable standard for proving up group defamations or 
true threats.
 
254
Contrary to my doctrinal understanding of these cases, 
Professor David Cole criticizes HLP for being out of step with 
precedent.
 This distinction is logical because material sup-
port might involve discourse that is not harmful on its face, al-
beit increasing organizations’ standing and credibility, while 
true threats and group defamations are by definition menacing 
to the public at large or some targeted segment thereof. Thus, 
the greater potential for error and abuse in the enforcement of 
material support statutes required a heightened level of scruti-
ny that would be unfitting for the other two categories. 
255 Cole has a unique interest in HLP outside the 
realm of academic discourse: he argued the case on behalf of 
the Humanitarian Law Project before the Supreme Court.256 
Curiously, Cole and Volokh seek to distinguish the holding in 
HLP from an earlier one in Citizens United.257 In Citizens Unit-
ed, the Court relied on strict scrutiny analysis to overturn a 
federal restriction on independent corporate expenditures with-
in a statutorily proscribed period of time.258
 
 253. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 n.6. 
 Cole inaccurately 
 254. See id. at 2723–24. 
 255. David Cole, The Roberts Court v. Free Speech, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
Aug. 19, 2010, at 80, 81. 
 256. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 257. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 898 (2010); Cole, supra 
note 255, at 81 (“In Citizens United, the Court imposed a heavy burden of jus-
tification on the government, and required solid evidentiary support for all 
justifications that the government offered. . . . By contrast, in Humanitarian 
Law Project, the Court upheld the material support law based on justifications 
that were unsupported by evidence . . . .”). 
 258. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 898. The strict scrutiny test is com-
posed of two parts. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–
75 (2002) (“Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden to 
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asserts that “[t]he two decisions purported to apply the same 
First Amendment standard.”259 Volokh also believes HLP is not 
in line with Citizens United’s strong protection of speech 
against government regulation.260 To begin, both of these schol-
ars read the strict scrutiny standard into HLP.261 That stand-
ard is explicit in Citizens United,262
The problem, then, is not that the Court neglected to follow 
the Citizens United precedent, but rather that the case is inap-
posite to HLP. Cole and Volokh neglect to even mention the 
comparison between HLP and Black. Granted, the majority in 
HLP also made no reference to the opinion from Black. The link 
is nevertheless logical because Black dealt with a symbolic ex-
pression tied to a domestic terror group, the Ku Klux Klan,
 but not in HLP. Indeed, it is 
the contrast between the rigorous application of the standard in 
the former and the total absence of it in the latter that belies 
the purported symmetry between the two. Both scholars also 
seem to overlook that content—one supporting mass murder for 
political gain and the other campaign speech in a nonviolent 
political contest—does matter in judicial analysis of public safe-
ty and free speech claims. 
263 
and HLP was about foreign terrorist groups.264
 
prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compel-
ling state interest.”); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (as-
serting that substantive due process “forbids the government to infringe cer-
tain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).  
 Citizens United, 
on the other hand, involved corporate speech in support of po-
 259. Cole, supra note 255, at 80. 
 260. See Volokh, HLP Post 1, supra note 244 (noting that Citizens United 
overruled Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) which, 
before Humanitarian Law Project, was “[t]he only majority opinion until this 
one that has upheld a content-based speech restriction”). 
 261. Cole, supra note 255, at 80 (“The Supreme Court found that both laws 
restrict speech based on its content, and therefore had to undergo the Court’s 
most demanding standard of review, known as ‘strict scrutiny.’”); Volokh, HLP 
Post 1, supra note 244. But see Volokh, HLP Post 2, supra note 248 (“[I]t seems 
to me that Humanitarian Law Project is endorsing a test for content-based 
speech restrictions that is less restrictive (and thus, if I’m right, more speech 
protective) than strict scrutiny.”). 
 262. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech 
are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that 
the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.’” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 
464 (2007))).  
 263. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 264. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010). 
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litical campaigns unrelated to terror.265 While Humanitarian 
Law Project sought to provide purportedly benign aid to groups 
who espoused strategic terror, Citizens United was a nonprofit 
organization providing support for a political party that en-
gaged in non-violent democratic elections. The two are incon-
gruous. In HLP and Black, domestic and international public 
safety concerns, were critical to the judgments, while in Citi-
zens United the Court decided to expand the liberty of speech in 
matters of representative politics. The mens rea requirement in 
the material support for terrorists statute appeared to be Con-
gress’s effort to provide the necessary criminal element Justice 
O’Connor had identified in her plurality opinion to Black.266
The holding in HLP applies to the prosecution of any 
statements or conduct that lends material support to known, 
designated terrorists. Even support of terrorist groups that is 
purportedly directed toward peaceful activities, such as negoti-
ations, increases the availability of resources to perpetrate acts 
of political violence.
 
267 Contrary to the Court’s emphasis on pub-
lic safety, Professor Timothy Zick takes a distinctly liberty-
enhancing point of view, arguing that the ban on funding 
harms the communicative interest of individuals wishing to as-
sist designated foreign terrorist organizations.268 He regards 
communication with overseas terror organizations to be a pro-
tected form of speech.269
 
 265. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected 
the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should 
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associ-
ations are not ‘natural persons.”’). I have argued elsewhere that Citizens Unit-
ed was wrongly decided on other grounds related to the representative nature 
of political speech. See Tsesis, Self-Government, supra note 
 His analogy between advisory contacts 
1, at 739–51. 
 266. Black, 538 U.S. at 363–64 (plurality opinion). 
 267. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing how even relatively small contributions to a terror-
ist organization could aggregate to substantial support that enhances its abil-
ity to commit acts of terror); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding that aid to terror organizations is not pure speech be-
cause it can be just as readily be used for peaceful functions as for the pro-
curement of weapons); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that providing fungible funding for nonviolent 
activities “frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts”). 
 268. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: To-
ward a More Cosmopolitan Approach, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 947 (2011) [herein-
after Zick, First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective] (“Decisions like 
Humanitarian Law Project affect not only the ability of citizens at home to 
reach across borders, but also the thousands of citizens abroad working on 
peace-building efforts in places like Afghanistan.”). 
 269. Timothy Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging 
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and associations with terrorist organizations, on the one hand, 
and constitutionally protected political speech and truth seek-
ing, on the other,270 overlooks the special public safety concerns 
raised by foreign terror groups’ recruitment and planning activ-
ities in the United States.271 Advisory support given to a desig-
nated terrorist organization is not like protected communica-
tion in the marketplace of ideas, but a form of conduct that 
strengthens the political hand of an organization committed to 
paramilitary attacks against civilian and/or military personnel. 
Zick is no doubt correct about the need for courts to consider 
the transborder implications of regulations on global speech in 
order to prevent constitutional violations,272 but he is mistaken 
to argue that material support of terror organizations falls 
within the ambit of traditional speech norms like truth seeking, 
self-governance, and speaker autonomy.273
Prohibiting the funding and communicative support for or-
ganizations that have not renounced mass violence is not a re-
straint on constitutionally protected expression. The statute at 
issue in HLP, instead, seeks to prevent the intentional instiga-
tion of violence through back channel funding that is benign on 
the surface. Like true threats, helping a terrorist organization 
communicate more effectively before it has renounced political 
violence, can empower it and enhance its ability to murder, in-
 
 
Complexities of Transborder Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 157–58 (2012) 
[hereinafter Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire] (arguing that Humanitarian Law 
Project may be a “very bad precedent” because its recognition of statutory lim-
its on communications with transborder terror organizations “is arguably in-
consistent with several fundamental First Amendment principles,” such as 
those protecting political speech and truth seeking). 
 270. Id. at 158 (comparing the restriction on association with terrorist or-
ganizations to ideological restrictions on “disfavored persons or groups” in the 
early twentieth century). 
 271. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) 
(“‘Material support’ is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up 
other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends. It also 
importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that 
makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise 
funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”). 
 272. Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire, supra note 269, at 177. 
 273. Id. at 178 (“Granting robust protection to transborder speech, associa-
tion, and information distribution would serve a number of traditional free 
speech values, including the facilitation of citizen self-governance, truth seek-
ing, speaker autonomy, and checking governmental abuses of power wherever 
they occur.”); id. at 183 (arguing that Humanitarian Law Project tends to 
“chill the free flow of information” because a domestic newspaper making print 
space available to a foreign terrorist group may be accused of providing “mate-
rial support”). 
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timidate, extort, and recruit. 
The material support statute does not prevent individuals 
from independently advocating on behalf of those organiza-
tions, so long as they do not act in concert with them or under 
their direction.274 Just as Black did not prohibit membership in 
the Klan, HLP does not prohibit individuals from pledging alle-
giance to an overseas terror organization.275 The statute simply 
prevents the dissemination of funds and advice that increases 
terrorists’ abilities to rely on alternative support for instigating 
and committing acts of violence. “The criminalization of peace-
ful and legal speech that is coordinated with foreign terrorist 
organizations” is not, as Zick claims, “inconsistent with both 
traditional and cosmopolitan free speech principles favoring 
open interaction and dialogue across borders.”276 To the contra-
ry, foreign and domestic terrorist groups’ organizing principles 
are coercive and intimidating, not discursive. Where public 
safety is at stake, officials need not rely exclusively on “new 
technologies to counter extremist speech in the global thea-
ter.”277
  CONCLUSION   
 They can also turn to criminal laws like the material 
support statute. 
The Supreme Court reviews regulations on outrageous 
speech very differently than it does the criminalization of in-
tentionally intimidating statements. Offensive statements that 
merely shock the conscience or even repulse audiences are pro-
tected by the First Amendment. In Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n and Snyder, the Supreme Court confirmed that the First 
Amendment protects offensive and outrageous speech. The 
Court has handled cases of public intimidation quite different-
ly. The harms associated with intimidation are not merely emo-
 
 274. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 (“Independent advocacy 
that might be viewed as promoting the group’s legitimacy is not covered [by 
the statute].”). 
 275. It is the intent of those burning the cross that is legally consequential, 
not their affiliation. Indeed, the plurality explicitly stated that two of the de-
fendants involved in the consolidated litigation “were not affiliated with the 
Klan.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 358, 350 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726 (arguing that because “[t]he 
statute reaches only material support coordinated with or under the direction 
of a designated foreign terrorist organization,” individual affiliation is not af-
fected). 
 276. Zick, First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective, supra note 268, at 
1014. 
 277. Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire, supra note 269, at 178. 
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tional or repulsive. There is a difference between someone 
burning a cross to anger others and someone displaying it in 
public to terrorize them. Contrary to the view embraced by 
some scholars, when it comes to public intimidation even 
speech that is not imminently dangerous can be curtailed. 
When statements, emblems, badges, symbols, or other forms of 
expression that are historically tied to persecution and harmful 
stereotypes are intentionally used to put others in fear of vio-
lence, they are unprotected by the First Amendment. 
